and implementers, and the supportive or approving society accountable27. This relies on the assumption that statements of truth around criminal acts undertaken, identification of individual perpetrators, and appropriate punishment are necessary to reinforce reconciliation initiatives, particularly by ending impunity28. In referring to state policy advisors and implementers, that is to hold accountable those in the conflict-affected regime rather than those in the government at the time of transitional justice and post-conflict integration measures. The individual responsibility proposed falls along what currently exists in the global justice framework – exemplified by the International Criminal Court and its emphasis on individual accountability for actions undertaken.
VVHowever, the striking feature of this proposed understanding of responsibility is the societal tier, whereby citizens may be “held responsible for agreeing to and materially supporting – for example, through taxation – state policies that produced mass atrocity”29; she argues that as the atrocities progressed in Bosnia specifically, society became receptive to the military successes and normalized and legitimized the criminal proceedings. Subotic’s analysis is powerful, and constructs a revised way of looking at ethnic conflicts, particularly in light of the International Criminal Tribunals that also focus on the individual perpetrators. Given the EU’s commitment to promoting and sustaining human rights, equality, and the rule of law, it would be worthwhile to consider the implications of Subotic’s findings on EU accession requirements in the future.
VVBieber’s analysis of power-sharing separates institutions into three parts: the legislative, governmental, and veto-wielding sharing of power, all of which must exhibit a shared decision-making process at each stage, rather than each group dividing up its own responsibilities[1]. Power sharing must be exhibited at the parliamentary level since in a democracy, these are the institutions where laws are proposed and passed, and where the people of the state are represented. Power sharing should be exercised at the governmental level through a legal framework requiring cooperation between groups – although this reduces minority inclusion to simply a fulfillment of a legal requirement, it assists in the political process of coalition building in the executive branch[2]. Finally, veto rights are a significant factor in power-sharing agreements, but their high stakes mean that they can have very negative consequences on the functioning of the arrangement, particularly when an issue being discussed is of “vital interest” to one or more of the groups[3]. The symbolism of power-sharing should not be understated, since a maintained power-sharing arrangement begins to define a state as multiethnic, and its
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27. Subotic 2011
28. Mendeloff 2004
29. Subotic 2011, p.160