growth and is met by cherishment or cherishment’s lack” (Young-Bruehl, 32-33). Thus, contrary to an understanding of the ego as aggressively self-interested, this account suggests that the ego is enriched by relational encounters, receptivity, and circular currents of affection.
VVVIThis receptive notion of the ego appears alien in a society ruled by a normatively utilitarian and economic understanding of humanity. Young-Bruehl argues that this state of modern civilization encourages and demands ceaseless activity, hyper-communication, and a generally frenzied existence. In this environment “reflective, unhectic, receptive thought” (38) becomes nearly impossible, and meaningful and receptive connections and relationships suffer. The demands of modern civilization, internalised to some degree as the superego, force themselves upon the ego and weaken the capacity for a resilient and affectionate subjectivity. Copjec explores these enervative effects of the law and the superego by turning to the energizing effects of Antigone’s autonomy (as ego-assuredness) and the paralyzing effects of Creon’s dependency on the law.
VVVIAntigone exhibits autonomy in breaking with self-law, remaining indifferent to the empirical loved object, and rejecting the laws of the superego. Consequently, she receives satisfaction from the love she feels for her brother. In direct contrast to Antigone’s independence, Creon demonstrates a fixation and dependency on the law and the ideal, and thus experiences a perpetual deferral of satisfaction. While Antigone is driven by the satisfaction afforded from an affirmation of love, Creon remains inhibited, held back from satisfaction through a “fixation on the laws of the State” (Copjec, 44). Creon stays captive under the force of the superego, the “internalisation of the laws and ideals of the community” (Copjec, 45). These idealisations, proffered by the community and internalised by the superego, forestall satisfaction by forever demanding more from the ego, weakening the ego’s resolve. The inherent “fixation on dissatisfaction” demanded by the superego “exposes the ego to the vicissitudes of public opinion” (Copjec, 45-6). Creon’s “failure of nerve toward the end of the play, his bending to public opinion” (Copjec, 45), illustrates this weakening effect of the superego’s law on the ego. Creon’s enfeebled and battered ego prevents him from carrying out the ethical autonomous action called for in the play’s final moments. This fixation not only attenuates Creon’s resolve, it “causes him to be relatively indifferent to all others available to him,” as “he remains glued to an ideal he will never attain” (Copjec, 45). Creon’s cold and unreceptive indifference results from his dependency on striving toward the ideal as demanded by the superego, whereas Antigone’s loving indifference and active receptivity enables autonomy. The stark contrast between Creon’s dependency and Antigone’s autonomy reveals how the law, as manifest in the superego, reigns over and debilitates the ego thus preventing the capacity for autonomy.
Freud’s turn to define affection as aim-inhibited sexuality also serves to establish his notorious theory concerning the inherent antagonism between the individual and civilization. Freud argues that for aim-inhibited sexual affection to exist, which it must in order for friendships and social bonds to occur, civilization must impose restrictions and taboos upon sexual love. Social bonding through aim-inhibited libido is thus only possible in a civilization that demands the repression and redirection of the sexual instincts (Freud, 2010). Young-Bruehl finds that Freud’s rather myopic focus on sexual instincts in Civilization and its Discontents obscures the potentially reparative relationship between sociality and the ego instincts. She suggests that had Freud maintained the trajectory established by his early theory of the instincts, he may have realised “that the ego instincts might not be antagonistic to civilization as the sexual instincts are” (Young-Bruehl, 27). In effect, Young-Bruehl claims that Freud’s move away from love as an ego instinct and towards love as a libidinal instinct disavows the complimentary coexistence between a resilient ego and sociality.ed, Lacan describes this drawing close to satisfaction, this “near coincidence, of the drive with its object” as love, or “the illusion of love” (Copjec, 41). The autonomy in this account of love derives from the indifference of the lover towards the loved object. The sublimation inherent in loving, the “satisfaction of the drive by sublimation,” “testifies to the autonomy of the subject, her independence from the Other” (Copjec, 44). However, this independence or indifference is not directed towards the loved object as beheld in the lover’s eyes, but as the object is defined by external criteria. Antigone’s love for her brother epitomizes this specific form of indifference towards external law and active receptivity towards the loved object. Copjec describes Antigone’s indifference as directed towards what is defined as possible within the community. She states “whereas Hegel focuses on the merits of Antigone’s act of installing Polynices as ‘a member of the community…which sought to destroy him,’ Lacan views the act of the loving sister as a definitive break with her community.” In other words, the deed Antigone undertakes traces the path of the criminal drive, away from the possibilities the community prescribes…”(Copjec, 38). In her actions, Antigone is autonomous; she “is indifferent to external criteria, such as the good opinion of others” (Copjec, 40). While Antigone is indeed indifferent and autonomous with respect to moral laws, she is not apathetic or closed off from the capacity to love.
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