repression and redirection of the sexual instincts (Freud, 2010). Young-Bruehl finds that Freud’s rather myopic focus on sexual instincts in Civilization and its Discontents obscures the potentially reparative relationship between sociality and the ego instincts. She suggests that had Freud maintained the trajectory established by his early theory of the instincts, he may have realised “that the ego instincts might not be antagonistic to civilization as the sexual instincts are” (Young-Bruehl, 27). In effect, Young-Bruehl claims that Freud’s move away from love as an ego instinct and towards love as a libidinal instinct disavows the complimentary coexistence between a resilient ego and sociality.
VVVIWhile Young-Bruehl suggests that most of Freud’s later work departs from the notion of ego receptivity, in Civilization and its Discontents, Freud does actually maintain an acknowledgement of the open and loving nature of the ego. His discussion of the “oceanic feeling” alludes to the ego as a source of primary openness to the world. Freud begins Civilization and its Discontents with an explanation of the origin of “the religious feeling” experienced by some as “a feeling of an indissoluble bond, of a being one with the external world as a whole” (25). The ego, Freud clarifies, does not begin as something distinct and separate from the surrounding environment. The infant initially does not possess a sense of self, a sense of separateness from the rest of the world. The ego, as a demarcation from the outside, emerges only after the infant learns that she cannot access the mother’s breast without an outwardly directed cry for nourishment. The infant’s necessary recognition of an “outside” coincides with her recognition of an external object, the mother’s breast in this case, “which is only forced to appear by a special action” (Freud, 28). Thus the ego evolves from its primary all-encompassing state into something that appears “marked off distinctly from everything else” (Freud, 26). Freud claims that the “present ego-feeling is…only a shrunken residue of a much more inclusive…all embracing…feeling which corresponded to a more intimate bond between the ego and the world about it” (29). In some instances, the present ego-feeling, a distinct sense of self, exists alongside a preserved remnant of the initial ego-feeling. This conserved primary ego sensation, of being one with the world, manifests as the “oceanic” or “religious” feeling. While Freud presents this narrative principally to explain the psychological roots of religious sensation, he also folds in an indirect acknowledgement of ego relationality.
Freud’s turn to define affection as aim-inhibited sexuality also serves to establish his notorious theory concerning the inherent antagonism between the individual and civilization. Freud argues that for aim-inhibited sexual affection to exist, which it must in order for friendships and social bonds to occur, civilization must impose restrictions and taboos upon sexual love. Social bonding through aim-inhibited libido is thus only possible in a civilization that demands the repression and redirection of the sexual instincts (Freud, 2010). Young-Bruehl finds that Freud’s rather myopic focus on sexual instincts in Civilization and its Discontents obscures the potentially reparative relationship between sociality and the ego instincts. She suggests that had Freud maintained the trajectory established by his early theory of the instincts, he may have realised “that the ego instincts might not be antagonistic to civilization as the sexual instincts are” (Young-Bruehl, 27). In effect, Young-Bruehl claims that Freud’s move away from love as an ego instinct and towards love as a libidinal instinct disavows the complimentary coexistence between a resilient ego and sociality.ed, Lacan describes this drawing close to satisfaction, this “near coincidence, of the drive with its object” as love, or “the illusion of love” (Copjec, 41). The autonomy in this account of love derives from the indifference of the lover towards the loved object. The sublimation inherent in loving, the “satisfaction of the drive by sublimation,” “testifies to the autonomy of the subject, her independence from the Other” (Copjec, 44). However, this independence or indifference is not directed towards the loved object as beheld in the lover’s eyes, but as the object is defined by external criteria. Antigone’s love for her brother epitomizes this specific form of indifference towards external law and active receptivity towards the loved object. Copjec describes Antigone’s indifference as directed towards what is defined as possible within the community. She states “whereas Hegel focuses on the merits of Antigone’s act of installing Polynices as ‘a member of the community…which sought to destroy him,’ Lacan views the act of the loving sister as a definitive break with her community.” In other words, the deed Antigone undertakes traces the path of the criminal drive, away from the possibilities the community prescribes…”(Copjec, 38). In her actions, Antigone is autonomous; she “is indifferent to external criteria, such as the good opinion of others” (Copjec, 40). While Antigone is indeed indifferent and autonomous with respect to moral laws, she is not apathetic or closed off from the capacity to love.
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