The Fate of the Civilian Surge in a Changing Environment | Page 8

The Fate of the Civilian Surge
in a Changing Environment
Ryan S. McCannell
Introduction
Fifteen years after the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001, American policy makers are still struggling to define appropriate national security responses to the challenges posed by fragile states. The United
States (US) fights wars with great proficiency, yet it
lacks the same finesse in supporting successful transitions to lasting peace. The recent conflicts in Iraq
and Afghanistan taught Americans and the world
hard lessons about these complex and difficult transitions. These conflicts also highlighted the gaps and
seams among key U.S. international affairs agencies
– principally the Department of Defense (DOD), the
Department of State (DOS) and the U.S. Agency for
International Development (USAID) – in crafting unified responses to post-conflict instability.
These failures at a unified response have not been
for a lack of trying. At the height of coalition-led stability operations1 in Iraq and Afghanistan, the US
government (USG) made a significant, but incomplete
effort to bolster its civilian agencies’ capability to contribute to post-conflict reconstruction2 and stabilization3 (R&S), as well as improve coordination4 with
US military forces that struggled to respond to R&S
challenges for which they were ill-prepared. The discouraging final stages of both conflicts have created a
tendency to minimize and denigrate these efforts, as
well as overlook the USG’s substantial contributions
to R&S in other contexts. Indeed, policy makers and

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