The Fate of the Civilian Surge in a Changing Environment | Page 25

analyze and report on conflict and violence, as well
as design, manage and evaluate political development
and peacebuilding programs. As a cadre, these staffs
specialize in a wide range of functions, and possess
highly valued experience that could contribute to crisis response. Theoretically, they can be mobilized and
organized to respond to an R&S contingency – and
indeed, for short-term, high-priority crises, this often
happens.61 However, the longer a crisis lasts, the more
difficult it becomes for civilian agencies to sustain a
response without surge support mechanisms, because
most staff with relevant capability already have fulltime responsibilities elsewhere in the bureaucracy.
Fortunately, both USAID and the DOS began investing modestly in surge support mechanisms in the
wake of CRC’s dissolution. In 2013, USAID’s leadership transformed the office managing the agency’s
contribution to CRC into an internal “firehouse” of crisis surge support staff,62 composed of a few dozen individuals with relevant skills, active security clearances, and an ability to perform inherently governmental
work through congressionally authorized personal
services contract mechanisms.63 This fledgling effort
replicates the OFDA and OTI bullpen model across a
broader range of capabilities. Recently, CSO launched
a similar effort after consulting with USAID.64 It remains to be seen whether other civilian agencies will
follow suit.
The final personnel challenge, which requires little
elaboration, is the increased concern about operational security for civilian agency staff and contractors
in the wake of the September 2012 attack on the U.S.
consulate in Benghazi, Libya. The political salience of
the issue in the current presidential campaign makes
it difficult to forecast how civilian agencies’ presence

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