The Fate of the Civilian Surge in a Changing Environment | Page 10

place in piecemeal fashion, rather than through a holistic inventory of lessons learned to determine what
to jettison and what is worth retention. In contrast,
the history of R&S operations underscores the need to
capture these experiences deliberately, or risk paying
the price in time, dollars, and lives the next time such
capabilities are needed.
This paper is based on a literature review and interviews with more than 20 subject-matter experts
from across the U.S government who have designed,
advocated for, participated in, or evaluated the contributions of U.S. civilian agencies to R&S during the
past decade. The goal of this paper is to assess existing capabilities across four core policy objectives: 1)
improving policy coherence in U.S. civilian agencies’
R&S efforts, 2) expanding civilian agencies’ strategic
planning capacity, 3) mobilizing surge capacity for
civilian R&S experts, and 4) encouraging better coordination between civilian agencies and the DOD.
The review centers primarily on the headquarters operations – as opposed to field experiences – of the two
key civilian agencies engaged in R&S: the DOS and
USAID. The final section offers recommendations for
filling gaps and capitalizing on gains identified in the
analysis.
Historical context
The starting point for current U.S. policy on R&S
operations is the National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD) 44, issued by President George W. Bush
on 7 December 2005, during the height of stability operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.6 NSPD-44 reflected
a recognition by the White House that the transition
from combat to stability operations in both countries

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