The DIIIGEST September 2026 | Page 41

not an automatic workaround: a United States court will still expect proof that the release was validly granted, procedurally fair, and genuinely part of the foreign proceeding.
The discussion then moved to the“ Super NewCo”: an entity created or repurposed to establish a legal jurisdictional hook. For example, a group might create a company in England and make it an obligor under the debt so that it can propose a local plan. Courts there generally do not treat that artificial connection as automatically fatal. Instead, they ask whether it serves a legitimate, value-maximizing purpose and whether creditors support it, as opposed to a manipulative jurisdictional engineering aimed at prejudicing a class of creditors. Here, the panel paused to discuss the Brazilian system, which poses a structural contrast with the“ Super NewCo” approach. Rather than creating an offshore entity to export a restructuring to a different jurisdiction, Brazilian debtors often pull foreign holding and financing companies into a Brazilian judicial reorganization when they are functionally part of the domestic business. However, the Latin American airline cases are major exceptions to the Brazilian“ attraction” feature( Latam, Gol, and Azul), because Chapter 11 offered tools for aircraft leases and financing that Brazilian law did not provide.
Finally, the panel addressed recognition limits, addressing the question on whether courts should deny giving effect to a foreign restructuring proceeding. Recognition courts are generally cooperative, yet they are not rubber stamps. They may refuse relief where creditors lacked notice or a meaningful opportunity to participate, where there was a lack of procedural fairness, where the requested relief conflicts with fundamental domestic policy, or where the evidentiary record is inadequate. The flip side of the coin is the need for courts approving the original restructuring to consider whether their orders are likely to be recognized where the company’ s assets and creditors are located; otherwise, the restructuring may succeed on paper but fail in practice.
Ultimately, the debate turned on whether forum shopping is beneficial or harmful. Healthy forum shopping is defined less by where a case is filed than by why that forum was chosen, how creditors were treated, and whether other courts can confidently recognize the result. Selecting the most effective regime can reduce costs, preserve value, and encourage legal systems to improve. It becomes problematic when the jurisdictional connection is used to disenfranchise creditors, avoid due process, or obtain relief that cannot fairly be justified.

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