International politics
Failure of Sanction Regime
Failure of diplomacy and engagement to yield results the global community has instead
relied on economic penalties to compel Kim Jong Un regime to stop further provocations
By Louie Dane C Merced
N
orth Korea’s underground nuclear test on 9
September 2016 marks its fifth since 2006, and the
first time that it conducted two in the same year. This
is in addition to the country’s series of test launches
of mid-range surface-to-air and submarine-launched missiles,
although with mixed successes. The growing frequency of these
activities indicates North Korea’s steady progress in its nuclear
and missile programs, including the miniaturization of a nuclear
weapon that could fit into an intercontinental ballistic missile
(ICBM). More importantly, it highlights how a decade of sanctions
imposed by the international community has failed to induce any
been met with strong condemnation and economic sanctions by
the UNSC through the following resolutions: 1718 (2006), 1874
(2006), 2094 (2013), and 2270 (2016). The sanctions center on
placing trade restrictions on conventional arms and materials
related to the illicit nuclear and missile programs; freezing the
financial assets and travel bans for North Korean nationals and
officials involved in proliferation activities; and prohibiting export
of luxury items.
Following the fourth nuclear test in January 2016, the UNSC
passed Resolution 2270 which expanded the sanctions to
include mandatory inspections by UN Member States of cargo
going to and originating from North Korea which are transiting
in their respective territories; bans on sale of aviation fuel to, as
well as purchase of coal, iron ore, and other minerals from North
Korea; and updating the list of North Korean entities that will be
targeted by assets freeze. But as with all previous resolutions
and rounds of sanctions, North Korea continued with another
nuclear test in September – which is also believed to be its
strongest yet. This raises anew the question: Why are sanctions
failing to stop North Korea?
GAPS IN IMPLEMENTATION
meaningful change in the behavior of the North Korean regime
toward abandoning its nuclear weapons program.
CYCLES OF PROVOCATION
As the Korean Peninsula remains a flashpoint where armed
conflict could erupt and where strategic interests of major
powers directly intersect, the imposition of sanctions appears to
be the most prudent response by the international community
in managing the nuclear and missile provocations by North
Korea. Given the failure of diplomacy and engagement to yield
results (i.e. the Six Party Talks have not resumed since 2008),
the international community has instead relied on economic
penalties to compel the Kim Jong Un regime to stop further
provocations.
Every nuclear test by North Korea, in its continued disregard
for international agreements on nuclear non-proliferation, has
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The Dayafter November 16-30, 2016
A commonly held view is that China (and to some extent Russia)
ensures that any international response would not severely
cripple the North Korean economy and risk the collapse of
the Kim regime. While China also prefers denuclearization
of the Korean Peninsula and is displeased with the nuclear
provocations, it views the issue as secondary to preserving the
stability of North Korea. China fears that a regime collapse would
put its own domestic and geopolitical interests at risk: massive
refugee flows to the Chinese border and the possibility of a
unified Korean Peninsula aligned to the United States.
Thus, aside from providing cover in the UNSC, China is also
perceived as not being committed enough in implementing the
sanctions. China is the main economic partner of North Korea,
with $6.39 billion in bilateral trade in 2014; and amounting to as
high as 90 percent of total North Korean trade. While there have
been episodic dips in trade of oil and food which hint possible
discontent by China about North Korea’s behavior, it is unlikely
that the relationship will be fundamentally changed.
While China’s cooperation is crucial, the efficacy of the
sanctions against North Korea also hinges on the actions by the
rest of the international community. The 2016 report of the UN
Experts Group created under Resolution 1718 reported several
gaps that render the sanctions regime ineffective. It identified the
means through which the North Korean government avoids the