The Civil Engineering Contractor November 2018 | Page 32

INSIGHT
The process of asset registration emphasises how little infrastructure exists in the area.
rigorous anti-corruption policy
and conflict of interest (COI)
procedure where declaration of
COI, if any, is specifically addressed.
A whistle blower system has been
implemented.”
The timeline for the water transfer
component is as follows: feasibility
2006–2009; design of main works
2017–2019; construction of main
works 2020–2025; commissioning
2026. For the hydropower
component: further feasibility
studies 2016–2019; design of main
works 2019–2021; construction
of main works 2022–2026; and
commissioning 2026.
A challenging locale
Some of the challenges of the project
include overcoming the large-scale,
technically complex nature of the
water transfer project, working in
a harsh mountain environment, and
pioneering new systems to manage
the biophysical and social challenges
of the project.
In addition to technical challenges,
the project will not be without
administrative and legal challenges,
says Tente, who foresees potential
areas of challenge: “The first is
expectations by local communities
— by black economic empowerment
firms in the case of South Africa,
which means we have to look at the
ownership of all bidding firms, both
consultants and contractors. The
30 | CEC November 2018
two governments may also have
different expectations.”
Community empowerment during
Phase I was something “we are not
proud of” says Tente, and with
NGOs active in the area, this has to
be an area of much greater awareness
in Phase II.
“There may also be different
interpretations of the Phase II
Agreement, as already demonstrated
by the legal challenge in Lesotho.
Finally, there is the potential for
delays, notwithstanding the success
of Phase I in meeting deadline.
This project will be vastly different
from Phase I. We have already
had situations where we have had
to repeat processes, such as the
prequalification of the dam and
tunnel consultancy contracts. The
delegation of authority has been a
major challenge, as currently most
of the authority is at a higher level
than the project team or the officials
resident at Maseru. Often, matters
had to be referred to higher political
levels for decisions and this generally
involves a longer time frame.
“Where we’ve not done well is
in terms of delegation of authority,
which has led to a number of
stumbling blocks with almost all
decisions having to be made at a
high political level,” says Tente.
Another change since Phase I is
the requirement to maximise job
creation and skills transfer among
diverse groups — it would have
been a lot simpler to appoint a single
consultant for all roads and another
for all environmental issues, but
instead, the project management
unit had to issue a large number of
contracts. “We had to slice this cake
into manageable portions to create
opportunities for small and emerging
enterprises. We have also similarly
looked closely at procurement and
enterprise development.
“This all requires the appointment
of qualified personnel. Once they
are appointed, then give them the
authority to make implementation
decisions,” says Tente.
Tente notes that there has been a
constant tension and mistrust in the
overall project regarding Lesotho’s
need for power and South Africa’s
need for water. The project is highly
complex from a political point of
view. One of the challenges is the
perception that since South Africa
is a bigger country than Lesotho, it
dominates. On the other hand, there
is also a perception that the South
African money is spent in Lesotho for
the benefit of Basotho. “It requires
some persuasion to get people to
“One of South Africa’s strengths is its long coastline, which
means we can potentially benefi t from desalinisation of
water. Another source has to be recycling of water —
not much recycling occurs at the moment and this has
to increase.”
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