The Atlanta Lawyer August/September 2014 | Page 35

SLIP Student Essays
Justice Scalia explains this to mean, “when a criminal
statute has two possible readings, we do not choose the
harsher alternative,” (Internal quotations removed) (Scalia
11). Through his own reasoning and by quoting the majority
decision, Scalia speaks on all of the possible ambiguity in the
statute. Justice Scalia openly refutes the majority’s claim that
context, structure, history, and purpose resolve the ambiguity
of the statute by saying:
Context and structure do not support the majority’s
interpretation, history refutes it by showing that the
Government itself interpreted the statute more leniently for
many years and “purpose” supports it only if one imputes to
the statute a crime fighting purpose broader than the text
discloses. (Scalia 12)
In reference to “history” Justice Scalia is referring to the ATF’s
original position on the issue in 1968. The ATF originally took
the stance that the sale of a gun to an eligible buyer acting
on behalf of a third party was not prohibited, even
if the third party was an ineligible one. But, the ATF
changed their stance in 1979 to restrict the sale of
the firearm to the intermediary buyer to those acting
on behalf of eligible parties.

a false response would be a federal crime,” (Parenthetical
explanation added) (Scalia 14). In reference to the last quote
Scalia is reasoning that just because a question is asked on
a form required to be recorded by legal gun vendors, doesn’t
make it material, nor does it make it reasonable that a false
answer to it should be a federal crime.
Scalia’s main argument is summed up as, “we interpret
criminal statutes, like other statutes, in a manner consistent
with ordinary English usage” (Scalia 4). He uses the example,
“a vendor sells an item of merchandise to the person who
physically appears in his store, selects the item, pays for it,
and possession of it,” (Scalia 4) to reinforce his point that Mr.
Abramski was indeed the buyer the firearm and that if you
read the text in its plain usage, Mr. Abramski was the buyer
rather than his uncle.
Read the entire essay.

Scalia reasons that Mr. Abramski’s false statement
to question 11a regarding the identity of the buyer
(e.g. Abramski or his uncle) was immaterial based
on a ruling made in 1988 in Kungys v. United
States that “materiality is determined by asking
“what would have ensued from official knowledge
of the misrepresented fact”, “ (Scalia 2). Scalia
contends that no provision of the Gun Control Act
of 1968 prohibited Mr. Abramski from receiving
and possessing a firearm with his uncle’s money,
because his uncle is also eligible to receive and
possess a firearm. Scalia also reasons that Mr.
Abramski’s answer to question 11a was f