The Atlanta Lawyer August/September 2014 | Page 32

SLIP Student Essays
Gun-related Legislation in the United States
By Tseganesh Gebresilassie
Arabia Mountain High School,
Interned with DeKalb County
Solicitor General’s Office

T

he issue of gun-related legislation spans many
sensitive facets of “justice” in the legal system of the
United States of America. As of 2014, gun control has
become to some a matter of crime, while to others, a matter
of rights. These conflicting ideologies of the practicality of
gun laws have concurrently aroused a flame among the
American people that has only grown since the establishment
of the Gun Control Act in 1968; a legislative regulation
initially enacted solely to prevent the acquisition of firearms
by individuals less-than-qualified to arm themselves, and
further, to prevent these individuals from harming others.
With this understanding of the sole and primary causation for
the enforcement of gun restrictions in the U.S., I undoubtedly
find myself in support of the United States Supreme Court’s
decision in Abramski v. United States No. 12-1493.

It is not that the defendant purchased the gun for someone
else, but that he was compelled to be less than truthful about
it. The majority decision abides, unfortunately for Abramski,
to the previously mentioned federal statute 18 U.S.C. 922(a)
(6) which imposes criminal penalties on any individual who,
in connection with a firearm’s acquisition, makes false
statements about “any fact material to the lawfulness of the
sale.” In this case, and in many gun-related cases, the hand of
the courts is forced by otherwise dishonest and potentially illintentioned persons. The United States Supreme Court ruled
against Abramski and now requires under federal law that gun
purchasers specifically disclose if they are buying the gun
for another person. Upon review of the legal inconsistencies
brought to light by Abramski’s actions, I can only concede to
this ruling.

To adhere to the facts and facts alone, as the law naturally
intends, the narrative of Bruce Abramski’s actions are enough
of an argument in itself. On November 17th of 2009 Mr.
Abramski stepped into a gun store to purchase a Glock 19.
Upon purchase, he filled out the required form distributed by
the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives.
And on this federal document, Bruce Abramski checked
“Yes” upon where it asked for him to distinguish himself as
the “the actual transferee/buyer” of the weapon. And on this
federal document, Bruce Abramski lied. Mr. Abramski was not
purchasing the gun for his own personal use, but rather for
his uncle, who lived out of state and to whom Mr. Abramski
delivered the weapon. Here Mr. Abramski acted rather as
the “straw purchaser”; an individual acting as a middleman
making the purchase on behalf of someone else. The crime
here is not the transition of the weapon; the crime is neither
his uncle’s possession of the weapon, as he is qualified to
own it; the crime, in this case, is the falsification of material
information on a federal document designed for the protection
of the republic. Abramski was then convicted for consciously
producing false statements in his acquisition of a firearm, 18
U.S.C. 922(a)(6). By withholding this information Abramski
interfered with the dealer’s legal duty, under Chapter 24 of
Title 18 of the United States Code, to “maintain” and “keep”
accurate records pertaining to any purchase of a firearm “as
the Attorney General may … prescribe.”

The dissenting opinion of this case, provided by Justice Scalia,
questions the majority’s identification of Bruce Abramski’s
uncle as the “true buyer” of the handgun in question. Justice
Scalia utilizes his well-versed hand to dissect the etymology
of the case. Scalia claims the “plain language of the act”
and “ordinary English usage” makes it obvious that the gun
was “s(old)” to Abramski. While Scalia’s approach to the
narrative of the crime is straightforward and seemingly an
easy solution to a complex predicament, it lacks reference
to context. Relying solely on the versed narrative of the act
and attempting to permeate the logic surrounding its phrasing
should not be the basis of a court decision. The law and its
terms should always be the final definition of any ٕɑ