CONSENT AND ORIGINAL CONTRACT 61
peace and order in society. Hence Hume is correct to claim that any act of promising
is merely superfluous to the prior value bestowed upon our obligations through
observing the tangible benefits that they bring to society as a whole.
Throughout Hume’s critique of social contract theory, moral obligation is antecedent
to any act of promising.
Rather it is through reflection and a small degree of
experience and observation that we become aware of our duties and obligations, and
recognise that forfeiting our natural liberty in return for the benefits a government
provides, ensures the greatest possible utility for everyone in society. For Hume, it is
unnecessary to grant the act of promising a place above this moral obligation that is
felt prior to the act of consent. These views are also outlined in Of Morals where
Hume (1985: 568-569). states that, “a promise wou’d not be intelligible, before
human conventions had establish’d it” and more pertinently that “when any action, or
quality of the mind, pleases us after a certain manner, we say it is virtuous; and when
the neglect, or non-performance of it, displeases us after a like manner, we say that
we lie under an obligation to perform it”.
Hume is correct in judging that the promise contained within the social contract is an
unnecessary addition to the benefits we foresee arising from the pact, because rational
people would only agree to be bound by an obligation having already experienced the
benefits that it will bring. Without having this experience as a benchmark, it would
seem that people have no incentive to will such an obligation prior to experiencing its
result. As Hume (1985: 570) himself states, “the will never creates any new
sentiments”.
What this shows us is that Hume does not seek to disagree with other contract
theories in a way that dismisses the overall value of consent. Rather, he agrees that a
government founded through the true voluntary consent of the population is indeed
the most just foundation for government. Furthermore, he asserts (Hume 1987: 470)
that when we look into the world, both modern and historical, we rarely see cases in
which this kind of consent actually exists. If we then attempt, as Locke does, to
justify existing governments by expanding what exactly we mean by tacit consent, we