THE IRAQ WAR: NEW PERSPECTIVES 39
hypocrisy of the operations (Ansari 2006: 141). Furthermore, the politicisation of
humanitarian aid, expressed by the British Prime Minister when invading Iraq by
calling for a “military-humanitarian coalition” (Cochrane 2008: 152), dramatically
reduced its space, and external parties found it difficult to participate in the
reconstruction without being associated with the coalition and its war aims (Cochrane
2008: 153). Even the concept of reconstruction was, according to Cochrane (2008:
169), seen as a Western ideology and imperialism. Some factions would thus kidnap
or kill foreign aid and construction workers just as they would target soldiers.
Overall, what the coalition brought to Iraq was not positive: power supplies were
scarce, the number of casualties kept rising throughout the war, the state did not offer
much help to the population and the revelation of sexual humiliation and torture of
detainees in Abu Ghraib prison further antagonised the population (Ansari 2006: 139141; Conten 2014: 182). Sectarianism, which was already strong prior to the invasion,
exploded after the invasion as many moderate individuals joined extremist religious
groups as a way of surviving in the midst of the civil war.
Although the coalition’s failure to bring peace and democracy to Iraq is not only due
to these opposing worldviews of the coalition and Iraqis, both sides’ perception of the
war and of its actors helps to understand the context in which the operations took
place. Ultimately, the mindset of the troops and of the Iraqis resulted in difficulties
that hampered the peace and reconstruction processes. If the UN had been in charge
of these operations, they would arguably have been not only better planned and
coordinated, but probably more acceptable to the Iraqi population.
Beyond the Theorisation: Cultural Realities on the Ground
The groupthink dynamic that characterised the planning of the war overlooked the
long-term implication of the stabilisation process. Sharma (2009) claims that the
termination phase of a war (jus post bellum) is part of the conduct of the conflict and
should therefore be integrated into the planning of the war. Most scholars agree that
such an intervention requires taking into account the cultural realities of the host state,
and designing a policy according to these elements; that a long-term presence on the
ground is necessary; and that soldiers need to be trained for peacekeeping and state-