Chapter
5:
Analysis
of
stakeholders
in
Yemen
The
figure
and
table
above
display
an
impressive
array
of
formal
institutions
in
the
Yemeni
water
governance
regime.
Although
the
Ministry
of
Agriculture
and
Irrigation
is
regarded
as
most
powerful
governmental
actor
in
water
managing,
the
true
power
in
water
resources
management
is
at
the
large
landowners
and
farmer
sheiks
(private
agriculture)
(Zeitoun,
2009;
Hübschen,
2011).
The
behavior
of
these
irrigating
farmers
is
thus
key
to
success
of
reforming
Yemen's
water
sector
sustainably
(their
interest
and
goals,
perceptions,
and
the
resources
and
power
used
to
change
the
water
management
system).
5.3
The
instability
after
Saleh
The
supporters
of
Saleh's
regime
benefitted
from
his
crony
capitalism
framework
(Hill
et
al.,
2013),
while
violence
and
co-‐option
strategies
were
used
towards
Saleh’s
opponents.
This
“divide
and
rule”
tactics
provided
little
room
for
institutions
in
water
management
and
conflict
resolution
to
stabilize.
The
fall
of
Saleh’s
regime
is
likely
partially
responsible
for
the
further
destabilization
of
these
institutions.
Conflict
resolution
might
need
to
re-‐invent
itself,
while
at
the
same
time
stakeholders'
power
constellations
and
access
to
influential
networks
have
changed.
Saleh
"structurally"
bypassed
the
process
of
state
building
(Hill
et
al.,
2013).
Due
to
the
absence
of
strong
state
institutions,
conflict
resolution
over
water
resources
management
in
Yemen
is
in
first
place
a
local
governance
issue
(depending
on
the
scale
of
the
water
system).
The
collapse
of
the
Saleh
regime
destabilized
an
already
instable
governance
regime,
but
at
the
same
time
the
benefiters
of
the
Saleh
regime
have
still
retained
power
and
influence,
as
they
are
the
better
off
(wealthier)
and
continue
to
have
powerful
networks
(financially
and
forcefully).
One
of
the
main
messages
of
Hill
et
al.,
(2013)
is
that
the
interim
Government
struggles
to
push
political
and
economic
reforms
in
the
face
of
the
resistance
of
incumbent
elite
interests.
Political
decisions
(over
water
resources
management)
are
made
by
local
(tribal)
leaders.
A
small
elite
(about
10
key
families),
with
close
ties
to
the
(former)
president,
forms
Yemen's
political
economy.
This
elite
structure
has
remained
mostly
intact,
thus
ensuring
that
a
status
quo
in
the
division
of
power
between
the
powerful
and
wealthy
elite
and
the
powerless
poor.
The
poor
and
women
do
not
actively
participate
in
decision-‐making
processes,
which
further
contributes
to
inequalities
in
water
resources
allocation.
Combined
with
increasing
levels
of
unemployment
and
poverty
among
large
urban
populations
this
bears
the
potential
for
conflict
(Hübschen,
2011).
5.4
Stakeholder
analysis
in
water
conflicts
Conflicts
over
water
resources
management
in
Yemen
are
highly
contextual.
The
south
of
Yemen
is
socio-‐
culturally,
economically,
geographically,
climatically
very
different
from
the
north.
The
enormous
variety
of
socio-‐cultural
institutions
framing
local
norms
and
values
and
driving
local
behavior
results
in
a
wide
variety
of
conflict
settlement
arrangements.
To
analyze
these
processes
and
the
roles
of
the
stakeholders
it
is,
therefore,
necessary
to
focus
on
the
specific
characteristics
of
the
stakeholders
in
the
specific
context.
What
also
is
very
important
here,
in
relation
to
the
stakeholder
analysis
of
table
5.1,
is
that
because
of
the
limited
capacity
of
the
national
institutions,
the
real
implementing
power
of
supplying
or
protecting
water
resources
is
at
the
local
users,
at
field
level
(Hübschen,
2011).
Numerous
causes
prevent
people
to
access
the
legal
system
for
conflict
settlement.
Resolving
water
conflicts
thus
mostly
happens
at
this
level,
between
the
local
water
users,
and
often
based
on
traditional
mechanisms
outside
the
courtroom
(Hübschen,
2011).
Furthermore,
the
public
and
the
private
are
in
practice
very
much
intertwined.
Sheiks
hold
public
office
while
at
the
same
act
as
private
agents
(e.g.,
drillers
and
irrigators).
This
mix
between
public
and
private
roles
can
create
conflicts
of
interests,
provide
private
agents
access
to
public
resources,
can
contribute
to
increasing
inequitable
distribution
of
assets,
and
decision-‐making
over
water
resources
management
(Hübschen,
2011).
The Political Economy in Yemen of Water Management: Conflict Analysis and Recommendations
85
of
241