Chapter
4:
Context
and
contextual
changes
3.
Followed
by
an
outer
circle
of
selected
Hashid
and
Bakil
tribal
elite
and
religious
elite
(who
are
critical
as
a
group,
but
not
necessarily
individually
important
to
Saleh’s
decision-‐making),
4. And
finally
inconsistent
collective
influence
from
political
dynasties,
traditional
merchants,
technocrats,
political
party
elite,
and
dissenting
tribal
and
other
groups
at
the
outer
most
ring.
Informal
negotiation
processes
were
constantly
taking
place
among
the
different
layers
of
circles,
as
the
coalition
of
elites
used
the
state
to
maximize
their
own
interest
at
the
expense
of
the
broader
Yemeni
society.
The
patronage
system
was
built
on
rents
from
oil
exports
and
access
to
the
newly
liberalized
economy:
around
ten
key
families
and
business
groups
with
close
ties
to
Saleh
controlled
more
than
80
percent
of
imports,
manufacturing,
processing,
banking,
telecommunications
and
the
transport
of
goods
(Hill
et
al.,
2013).
Saleh’s
dominance
over
the
political
processes
was
also
strengthened
by
this
strong
system
of
patronage
(UN,
2011),
as
the
provision
of
patronage
to
elites
enhanced
the
regime’s
ability
to
contain
violence
and
maintain
its
centralized
rule.
Saleh
maintained
a
delicate
balance
of
power
between
his
close
family
members
and
his
inner
circle.
Thiel
(2012)
argued
that
the
increasing
concentration
of
power
around
Saleh’s
immediate
family
breached
unwritten
power-‐sharing
agreements
within
the
regime’s
inner
circle
and
eventually
led
to
veteran
regime
insiders
defecting
to
the
democracy
movement
in
2011.
At
the
moment,
Yemen
also
lacks
operational
institutions
to
exercise
restraints
on
these
groups.
Although
Yemen
has
supported
a
multiparty
political
system
since
1990
and
elections
have
been
held
regularly,
favouritism
towards
the
ruling
party
means
that
elections
have
not
resulted
in
the
accountability
of
officials
or
the
government
at
large,
or
have
offered
any
real
alternation
of
power
(BTI,
2014).
The
checks
and
balances
to
be
enforced
by
an
informed
civil
society
with
political
oversight
are
lacking,
which
increases
the
potential
for
abuse
in
the
exploitation
of
natural
resources,
including
water.
Furthermore,
potential
revenues
from
natural
resources
are
diverted
out
of
Yemen
in
the
form
of
illicit
financial
flows,
instead
of
being
utilized
by
the
government
for
investment
in
social
and
economic
development.
Corruption
can
be
the
source
by
which
illicit
funds
are
generated
and
laundered
(Reed
and
Fontana,
2011).
Nepotism,
patronage,
and
corruption
are
relevant
to
water
conflicts
in
Yemen
for
three
reasons:
1. A
direct
impact
is
that
rent-‐seeking
groups
are
formed,
which
do
not
always
take
measures
in
the
interest
of
the
society
at
large,
but
with
personal
gains
in
mind.
Over
time,
the
powerful
coalitions
of
rent-‐seeking
groups
become
greedier
and
demand
an
even
larger
influence
over
national
economic
policies
to
consolidate
their
advantage
(Lane
and
Tornell,
1996).
2. Indirectly,
family
members
and
other
affiliates
are
often
appointed
to
positions
despite
a
lack
of
qualifications.
In
terms
of
water
management,
nepotism,
patronage
and
corruption
may
lead
to
a
sub-‐
optimal
use
of
water
and
subsequently
poor
development
outcomes
in
terms
of
economic
growth
or
poverty
reduction
(Kolstad
et
al.,
2008).
3. Finally,
nepotism,
patronage,
and
corruption
will
have
likely
resulted
in
a
general
distrust
by
civil
society
in
the
formal
institutions
relevant
to
the
use
of
water
as
well
as
water-‐related
disputes.
The
political
context
of
Yemen
cannot
be
understood
without
mentioning
the
tribal
structure.
Tribes
are
major
social
forces
in
Yemen.
Tribes
are
mainly
realities
of
the
northern
and
eastern
parts
of
Yemen,
whilst
the
west
and
the
south
of
the
country
consist
of
landlords
and
peasants
(Al-‐Zwaini,
2012).
Tribal
customary
laws
strongly
affect
the
implementation
of
legislation
and
contribute
to
the
regulation
of
conflicts
(Al-‐Dawsari,
2012
and
Al-‐Zwaini,
2012).
Traditional
tribal
leaders,
sheikhs,
are
selected
based
on
a
combination
of
heredity,
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