Putin’s insane but solipsistic worldview that was not being realized through inhumane actions against his own citizens solely within
the borders of Russia (something a dictator ruling through the authoritarian state would do).
As such, the tools – coalitions, alliances, sanctions, communication, military support, etc. – need to be engaged. But the West needs to realize this is neither business as usual, nor is it the practice of an authoritarian. Putin is ready to play the long game: as the US intelligence chief has made clear, Putin is betting on “US and EU support for Ukraine to weaken as inflation, food shortages and energy prices get worse.”43
And yes, Putin has nuclear and chemical weapons; and this makes him a formidable threat. But even nuclear and chemical weapons or even the use of the new hypersonic weapons as was used against Odesa are not the weapon of choice if Putin is to achieve his endgame. Terror is. And the West needs to ready itself for continuing threats designed to terrorize individuals and create cracks in the western alliance through closing off oil and gas reserves, disrupting wheat and other commodity production, and displacing and/or making millions homeless and hungry. It also needs to be prepared should Putin move against Finland and Sweden, or revisit his 2008 invasion of Georgia (where, without international support coming to Georgia’s aid, Putin did not stop his assault until he acquired certain regions).
Now effectively engaged in a proxy war with Russia, the West needs to ready a response to an actual assault on NATO countries. This includes countries scheduled to align with NATO, such as Sweden and Finland, as Russia’s foreign ministry has directly threatened Finland with “retaliatory steps, both of a military-technical and other nature, in order to stop the threats to its national security that arise in this regard,” stating “joining NATO will also be a direct violation of Finland's international legal obligations, primarily the Paris Peace Treaty of 1947 and the 1992 Treaty between Russia and Finland on the fundamentals of relations.42 Dmitry Medvedev, former Russian president, has actually warned of a Russia-NATO nuclear war over western help to Ukraine.44
So, Biden and western allies are thus trying to thread the needle, if you will, even as they send longer range missiles into Ukraine which could ultimately end up striking Russia, saying that such weapons need to be positioned deep within Ukraine so such a strike would not be possible. We’ll see how successful such a move proves – particularly, should things worsen and Ukrainian commanders on the ground look to such weapons as a last-ditch hope to push Russian troops out of the Ukraine or buy some more time for a negotiated settlement. As we know, violence (and, hence wars) start when language and conversations fail. A strike inside Russia by Ukrainians using NATO equipment won’t start a conversation: it will only increase the odds for stronger retaliation. “The art of the possible” has always been used to describe international relations, but the prospect of the probable will more likely be an apt description for such an event.
Now, Biden has signaled the need for regime change (“For God's sake, this man cannot remain in power.”), and the US Defense Secretary has said (“We want to see Russia weakened to the degree that it can't do the kinds of things that it has done in invading Ukraine.”).45 But Biden should not walk back such claims, even if they are but signals. All understand that pushing Putin into a corner without an offramp is dangerous: European allies did not allow Hitler an offramp and thus a world war had to be fought to the bitter end. And, arguably, the West engaged in such a strategy because Hitler did not have nuclear weapons. Given Putin does have control of such weapons, it goes without saying the US must be careful. All the same, any attempt at providing an offramp should be conditioned upon regime change. Otherwise, the US and its western allies could find themselves in the same situation a day later.
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