already belonged to (A) himself. Thus this contract was legally impossible and the contract was
void. There may also be the case of commercial impossibility, which was demonstrated in the
case of Griffith v Brymer82, where one party hired a room from another party to view a
coronation event on a specific date, but the event was cancelled. Thus although the performance
of the contract was physically and legally possible, the cancellation of the event undermined the
commercial object of the contract, thus the contract was found to be void, based on a
fundamental common mistake.
Thus, it is observed that in the majority of cases which surround a common mistake about (a) the
existence of the subject matter of the agreement, or (b) a mistake related to the possibility of
performing the contract, that the law is quite settled in this area, since the result is usually that
the contract is void due to a fundamental mistake. It is important to note this distinction because,
when one shifts one’s attention to a common mistake as to the quality of the contract, one
immediately recognizes the instability of the law in this area. The principal decisions here
include cases such as Bell v Lever Bros and Solle v Butcher possessing contradictory theories to
the law of common mistake. These cases prove the point that the law on common mistake had
already been unsettled and controversial. The situation exacerbates in Great Peace, where in an
attempt to clarify the law, the judgement in fact obscures the law even more, and intensifies the
controversy in the law of common mistake. One might argue that Great Peace even diminished
the law of common mistake to a nullity.
UNSETTLED AREA OF THE LAW ON COMMON MISTAKE PRIOR TO
GREAT PEACE
(c) Common mistake as to the quality of the contract
What does one mean by a common mistake as to the quality of a contract? Suppose A sells a
vase to B, both believing it to be an antique, but subsequently they both discover that it was
actually an ordinary vase. This is a common mistake as to the quality of the contract. The
question is whether B can claim that the mistake is fundamental enough to have the contract
82
(1903) 19 TLR 434
63