STEP CHANGE FOR SAFETY GLOBAL SHARING DEC 2013 - SAFE NAVIGATION | Page 22

GLOBAL SHARING MONTHLY NEWSLETTER – DEC. 2013 - NAVIGATION
KEY MESSAGE: REMAIN VIGILANT, EXPECT THE UNEXPECTED & TAKE EARLY ACTIONS.
WHAT HAPPENED:
A Partially loaded Chemical tanker was involved in allision with a jetty walkway trestle during berthing under Pilotage in
Singapore.
The Chemical tanker equipped with a bow thruster had a tug made fast on the port side fwd of break of accommodation.
The Pilot made a T-boning approach to the jetty at high speed. When the vessel was two ship lengths from the jetty she
had a speed of 2.8 knots. The expected currents were negligible as per available information. The tug could not turn
around the vessel as required and the bow thruster was not used. When it became apparent to the Master that the
allision had become imminent, he ordered the Engines full astern and bow thruster 100% to Port.
WHY IT HAPPENED:
1) The MPA towage guideline recommends two tugs for berthing on that jetty, but one tug was used as vessel had bow
thruster
2) The bow thruster was not used effectively.
3) Lack of knowledge that bow thruster is not effective when the vessels speed is more than 3 knots , and is most
effective when the vessel is stopped.
4) T-boning the jetty while berthing is not the correct approach.
5) The Duty Officer was not instructed and did not inform the Master and the Pilot the vessels speed and distance off
from the jetty.
6) Master should have aborted the maneuver when the Pilot took to T-boning the jetty.
7) The decision made by the Master to run the engines astern and run the bow thruster was delayed.
8) The Master/Pilot information checklist had not been fully completed.
LESSONS LEARNED / POINTS TO PONDER:
1) Is decision making a difficult process for the Masters ?
2) Although legally the Master is responsible for his vessel, the Pilot has the conduct of the vessel within port . Does the
tradition that the Master has to shoulder the consequences of an incident or accident under Pilotage require a change?
3) Have the checklists achieved their purpose? Or have they made a sea-farer lose their capacity to think out of the
checklist box?
4) Can all probable situations be included in a checklist?
5) Should we first concentrate on developing seafarers having the right attitude, and decision making capacity based on
logical thinking?
REMARKS:
THE CEMENTED WALKWAY ON THE FLOATING
STRUCTURE SUFFERED CRACKS FROM THE
LIGHT ALLISION AS VESSEL SWUNG OUT (AFTER
MASTER TOOK CHARGE AWAY FROM PILOT).
DUE TO MASTER’S ABORTIVE ACTION, A MUCH
BIGGER DAMAGE TO THE JETTY WAS AVOIDED.

ST

31

DEC 2013

A Shell Marine Contractors Safety Initiative