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Volker’ s attorney later moved to withdraw and, at the hearing, informed the court that Volker had instructed him not to disclose material subject to the discovery order. Nygaard subsequently moved to strike Volker’ s answer and counterclaim for failure to comply. The district court gave Volker another opportunity to comply with discovery, again warning that continued noncompliance could result in severe sanctions, including striking his pleadings.
Despite this additional opportunity, Volker failed to comply. After a subsequent hearing, the district court found Volker engaged in deliberate or bad faith noncompliance with its discovery orders. The court then imposed sanctions under Rule 37, striking Volker’ s answer and counterclaims and allowing Nygaard to proceed to default judgment.
The district court ultimately voided the quitclaim deed, quieted title in Nygaard, and awarded damages, costs, and attorney’ s fees. The court also imposed Rule 11 sanctions, concluding Volker’ s claims lacked evidentiary support.
On appeal, the North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed. The Court held Volker waived his challenge to the Rule 11 sanctions by failing to respond in the district court. It further emphasized that because Volker did not seek relief from the default judgment under Rule 60( b), appellate review was limited to whether any irregularities appeared on the face of the judgment. Finding none, the Court concluded Volker could not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence or the finding of forgery and affirmed in full, underscoring both the consequences of discovery misconduct and the limited scope of review following default judgment.
City of Dickinson v. Helgeson, 2026 ND 34. Filed 2 / 12 / 26.
Helgeson was charged with a noncriminal violation of the Dickinson Municipal Code for failure to display license plates. The case was transferred from Dickinson Municipal Court to State District Court for a jury trial. During the pre-trial proceedings, Helgeson engaged in extensive, mostly needless, and groundless pretrial motions practice that included requests to disqualify the prosecutor, to continue the trial, to rehear the denial of the continuance motion, and to stay the case. Helgeson also filed motions in limine, three motions to dismiss, and a motion to disqualify the judge. The docket contained 277 entries, the majority of which were generated by Helgeson’ s motions practice. Helgeson also engaged in tactics and conduct that was frivolous. A jury ultimately found Helgeson“ guilty” of the underlying traffic violation, although in this context the use of the word“ guilty” is a misnomer because the charge is a noncriminal violation of city ordinance. The trial judge also designated Helgeson a vexatious litigant. Helgeson appealed the order designating him as a vexatious litigant.
On appeal, Helgeson claimed the traffic violation was a criminal proceeding and argued the district court lacked jurisdiction to determine he was a vexatious litigant. Supreme Court Administrative Rule 58 provides the procedure for designating a litigant vexatious and is not applicable to criminal actions. However, the Supreme Court found that, despite the jury’ s verdict of“ guilty,” the underlying traffic violation was a noncriminal offense, so the trial judge had the authority to designate him a vexatious litigant under Administrative Rule 58. The Court reviewed the record and found Helgeson’ s extensive, groundless pretrial motions and frivolous tactics and conduct supported the vexatious litigant designation, and the district court did not abuse its discretion by entering the vexatious litigant order. Helgeson also claimed the vexatious litigant designation violated his equal protection rights, First Amendment rights, right to open courts, and due process rights. The Court reviewed prior caselaw that had already determined the constitutional implications of the vexatious litigant designation and found Helgeson’ s constitutional challenges were without merit. The Court affirmed the order designating Helgeson as a vexatious litigant.
The city requested sanctions by way of an award of attorney’ s fees against Helgeson for the use of fictitious cases in his appellate brief. The Court created a grid showing Helgeson’ s offered citations, the actual case with the corresponding state reporter or regional reporter citation, and a case with a similar title. The Court determined that five of the cases cited by Helgeson were fictitious and noted fake or nonexistent legal citations typically are the result of artificial intelligence( AI) hallucinations. The Court noted it was not criticizing the use of AI or AI-assisted tools. To the contrary, the Court stated it encourages and embraces the use of technology and views the use of AI-related technology as a means to improve access to the Court. However, the Court also noted the use of technology and AI requires careful use and scrupulous verification of the arguments and authorities generated by anyone using the tool. The Court determined it did not matter whether Helgeson’ s fictitious cases were the result of AI hallucinations or careless work, as Helgeson is responsible for the consequences of his errors. The Court awarded the city $ 500 from Helgeson as a sanction for his misconduct and warned all litigants that using erroneous citation to authority, and providing courts with citations to fictitious cases, exposes the filing party to the imposition of sanctions appropriate under the circumstances.
Bauer v. Adam, 2026 ND 67. Filed 3 / 3 / 26.
Bauer appealed from a pre-filing order declaring him a vexatious litigant and orders denying his motion for default judgment and sanctioning him. The Supreme Court affirmed the pre-filing order, dismissed Bauer’ s appeal from the orders denying his motion for default judgment and sanctioning him, and awarded Appellees double costs and Harlow’ s School Bus Service attorney’ s fees in the amount of $ 1,000.
After Harlow’ s terminated Bauer’ s employment, he commenced suit against current and former Harlow’ s employees, alleging civil conspiracy, constitutional tortious interference, and defamation.
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