Space Education and Strategic Applications Journal
and hardware for this sector may need to be considered differently . The Space ISAC establishment discussed earlier in the paper justifies this approach . Further , for any space orbital resources , much of their energy remains independent of terrestrial sources as orbiting satellites have the most direct solar potential and do not require as much support as ground-based energy sources . All ground-based stations and capabilities do require power with most sources from the terrestrial energy sector . The Defense Industrial base and critical manufacturing sectors currently cover some space aspects although these could be likely managed more efficiently as a direct space CI responsibility . Lacking any central governing body devoted to Space CI protection means unique facilities for launch , command and control , and positioning are likely left unprotected under current CI protection . All of these aspects lead to evaluate H3 as false since space CI does not appear to be effectively protected by overlapping CI sectors .
Conclusion
In conclusion , this paper evaluated a brief history of the CI process , to determine when CI was established and what factors were used to determine individual sectors . The next step proposed a method to evaluate whether space CI was needed and the metrics used before moving to consider what constituted space infrastructure . Those considerations lead to evaluating three hypotheses ; whether space contributes to public safety , health , and the economy , whether space contributes uniquely to national security , and if space CI today is sufficiently covered by other national resources . The first two proved to be true with space ranking number one in combined scoring and ranking above 11 of the remaining sectors during individual scoring . The third hypotheses was evaluated as false since no other sector adequately covers space CI . Some overlap does occur although those same areas also overlap numerous other CI sectors with none precisely matching space . These areas lead to the three recommendations , establishing a model for space CI interactions , developing a regular process for evaluating CI , and finally , including space as a CI sector as soon as possible . Finally , remaining potential gaps and areas for future study will be discussed .
One of Moltz ’ s recommendations suggests any model for space should be a netocracy . his netocracy would be international , transparent , commercially lead , networked , with small resilient platforms and bottom-up innovation ( Moltz , The Changing Dynamics of Twenty-First-Century Space Power ). Several of these characteristics could benefit any future space CI protection structure . The first characteristic , international , does not translate to CI protection however international norms will be needed to manage orbital space both physically and electromagnetically . Standards must be established to control orbital debris as well as to manage orbital frequency usage to prevent losing control of functions vital to public health and national security . Transparency between commercial
72