of individual governments . Pattison goes as far to argue that intervenors are “ morally required to take on greater [ human ] costs , rather than distributing these costs to morally innocent civilians ” ( 2014 : 114 , 129 ). If the alternative is a less efficient or successful intervention , this is preferable . Whatever costs there may be for local populations , they must be justifiable through a law of double effect for moral legitimacy ( Tesón , 2003 : 94 ).
Rules for intervention need not be a strict and definitive criteria . Scheid outlines five general conditions that a moral intervention must meet : “ right authority , right intention , last resort , reasonable prospects , and proportionate means ” ( 2014 : 10 ). Each of these can be met on a case-by-case basis , through an international forum . The international community must ensure these standards are consistently met , should a moral obligation to intervene arise . Only through a reform to international law and due process via the United Nations can this be done . While maintaining a defence
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166 of sovereignty , Walzer rightly concludes that ultimately it is “ the society of nations ” ( 2015 : 106 ) as a whole that has the moral right and obligation to act .
Militarily intervening in other countries is never a desirable course of action . However , in cases of humanitarian crisis , when all peaceful forms of rectification have been ruled out , it may be a moral obligation for the international community to act . Many philosophers raise rightful concerns over the implications of such action , but these concerns are not sufficient to rule out intervention . When abuses of human rights are provable , and intervention is estimated to be proportionate , it is not simply morally permissible but a moral obligation . International cooperation is necessary to enable the fair fulfillment of this obligation .
Bibliography :
Beitz , C . R . ( 1980 ) ‘ Nonintervention and Communal Integrity ,’ Philosophy & Public Affairs , 9 ( 4 ), pp . 385-391