Tyler Robinson
81 ). This is because Mill adopts a libertarian approach to language , upholding the harm principle ( p . 110 ).
If we apply Fregean minimalism to Mill ’ s harm principle , legal restrictions on racial epithets would only be required if the specific use of a racial epithet had the colouring and intent which intentionally incited harm to the rights of others , such as a member of the Ku Klux Klan pointing a mob of white supremacists to a Jewish person ’ s house and exclaiming “ the person in this house is a k * ke !”, as is it likely to incite violence and cause harm to the Jewish person and their property . Clearly , in this example , the colouring of this sentence is meant to cause offence and incite violence towards the Jewish person , due to the hints and context of the speaker ( Frege , 1948 , p . 213 ). It is worth noting that the law in the United Kingdom has a similar outlook , which , like Fregean minimalism , focuses on the intention behind the mention of slurs , with the Public Order Act 1986 banning threatening and harassing language directed at ethnic minorities , if the intention is to incite racial hatred . I also emphasise this aspect of the speaker ’ s intent , which Frege
Gottlob Frege
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