PHIL276 Language in Society
seriously if she still has the capacity to value . Critical interests , on this account , go ‘ hand in hand ’ with the ability to value ( Jaworska , 1999 : 113 ). If this is the case , Jaworska argues , then ‘ conceptually , such values may be understood as quite independent of the agent ’ s grasp of her life as a whole ’ ( Jaworska , 1999 : 117 ). Of course , this may be the most contentious aspect of the argument , but it is one that I tend to agree with . I agree initially that critical interests only come about through valuing certain things that you deem to be good . Valuing as well can be differentiated from desires because , I would argue these values are situation independent . Further , on account of my defence of a ‘ stream of consciousness ’ mode of personal identity , we need not worry about Dworkin ’ s insistence of valuing the critical interests of her life ‘ as a whole ’ - as the whole is simply the timespan of the potential for a c-system to work continuously to create a stream of consciousness . What is of concern is the question of whether demented patients can hold values ; if they cannot , then we must find another way to respect the demented person ’ s wishes , if we must at all . Since this question is primarily an empirical one , Jaworska offers some examples of dementia patients who can hold values . I believe his Dr B . example brings out the point that Jaworska
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is attempting to make . Dr B was an Alzheimer ’ s patient who could not recall the day , month or year , and struggled to remember his life as a whole . However , he did value his experiments that he helped Dr S . Sabat with more than going to the day centre and completing ‘ meaningless ’ activities . Through valuing this work , ‘ Dr B .’ s sense of pride and self-worth that ensued from his participation ’ increased ( Jaworska , 1999 : 118 ). Again , assuming the veracity of this scenario to be true , there is little doubt that Dr B could value something , which added to his importance , and his sense of selfworth . I agree with Jaworska that reframing critical interests as values certainly accounts for demented patients holding these values , and as such having autonomy . There is no necessary connection between remembering your past and having values . Especially when we would all agree that values can change , it would be counterintuitive to argue that since we cannot view the entire landscape of our lives that this change cannot happen or has a lesser status than precedent autonomy . On this account , we can redefine autonomy . Jaworska defines autonomy as the capacity ‘ to espouse values and convictions , whose translation into action may not always be fully within the agent ’ s mastery ’ ( Jaworska , 1999 : 126 ). I