PHIL276 Language in Society
constitute a self iff the capacity for a stream of consciousness is continuous ( Dainton , 2014 : 94 ). Stream of consciousness acting as the persistence condition for selves has serious consequences for the Margo case which I shall come on to shortly .
Another argument in favour of psychological continuity for selfhood can be made by exploring zombies in a philosophical category . Philosophical zombie arguments typically support the existence of phenomenal consciousness , but we can apply the same reasoning here in problems of personal identity . A philosophical zombie is a person who acts like a human in every way and looks like a human except it lacks consciousness . Since they are not subjects of experience , we could ask the question whether they are selves to begin with ? ( Dainton , 2014 : 193 ). It would be intuitive to say that they are not selves ; Dainton argues that they are selves of a different kind , which may be the case , but they are certainly not selves in the way that you , I or Margo are selves since there is no psychological continuity , no stream of consciousness through this zombie . Now , if you accept that these zombies are possible , and we would intuitively say that they are not the same as us ( as they have no consciousness ), then it seems
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we would have to conclude that psychological properties such as having the capacity for conscious experience are the salient features in determining selfhood . Even , in reality , if a philosophical zombie does not appear ; taking the argument as a thought experiment , can coax out our intuitions that the physical organism , the ‘ outer shell ’ as some may say , is not enough for us to assert that this is a ‘ person ’ - there must be more to personal identity than merely the physical atoms that construct the organism .
In the case of Margo , there is a new self . Margo , eating peanut butter jelly sandwiches is not , and unfortunately will never be , the same as the Margo making advanced directives a few years earlier because their stream of consciousness is so radically different . Dementia Margo does not remember most of her previous life events , she does not remember the advanced directives and has different thoughts and feelings . She is a different Margo . Once the disease accelerated and rapidly broke down her brain cells , Margo ’ s stream of consciousness ended and a new , weaker form began . Whether Margo pre-dementia made these demands to die if she became demented is not important here as we have a new self ; a Margo who loves eating sandwiches and is happy in her own room . Why