PHIL332 Existentialism
allows us to counter a second critique often launched against her : that she did not take into account varying conceptions of “ womanhood ”. Spelman points out for instance that De Beauvoir “ sabotages her insights about the political consequences of the multiple locations of women ” ( Spelman , 1990 : 64 ). She highlights how in De Beauvoir ’ s comparisons between the situation of women and other groups such as “ Jews , the Black , the Yellow ” and the proletariat , she is obscuring the fact that “ half of the populations to whom she compares women consist of women ” ( Spelman , 1990 : 64 ). It seems for Spelman then , that when Simone de Beauvoir proclaimed that “ one is not born but rather becomes a woman ” she was really only referring to one type of woman ; ignoring the fact that females are made into “ women in so many different ways ” ( Spelman , 1990 : 72 ).
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There have been a number of attempts at explaining De Beauvoir ’ s erasure of the experiences of different women in her theory . Okely suggests for instance that De Beauvoir doesn ’ t talk about intersecting race or class oppressions because as an existentialist she prizes individual will over social factors ( Spelman , 1990 : 72 ). This flies in the face of everything she has to say about gender , however . As I have argued , a better explanation lies in De Beauvoir ’ s “ body in situation ”.
Through putting forward the “ body in situation ”, Beauvoir carefully manages to navigate around essentialising categories of identity or difference . In understanding “ woman as becoming ” she recognises that the pursuit of “ shared gender experiences is spurious and exclusionary ” ( Stavro , 2007 : 444 ). Beauvoir ’ s “ body in situation ” in contrast manages to