allied efforts and portraying this action as a moral campaign against
brutal governor (Thussu, 2000). Overall, we see a disparity between TV
news and newspapers conducting a sympathy and critical line, whereas
TV news (CNN) persisted supportive attitude.
Compared with the Bosnia case, Kosovo seems to reveal little evident
policy uncertainty. Explicitly, the policy of the effective function of air war
and no intention of launching ground offensive is unremittingly confirmed.
For example, Robinson (2002, p.103) referred to the State Department
Press Briefing released on 13 April 1999, ‘We have confidence in the air
campaign. What we have made clear is that we don’t have any intention
now to introduce ground forces in a combat situation’. Moreover,
Robinson (2002, p.104) discovered that White House Press Briefing on
21 April 1999 stated: ‘This air campaign is the option that we believe
to be best as we are highly confident that it will get us to our military
objectives’. Although some subtle shifts from determined ‘no intention’
line to assuasive ‘best option’ line can be witnessed from those official
declarations, policy indeed never differed drastically from the guideline
that the air force was the backbone and there were no specific intentions
to launch a ground invasion in this period.
Overall the analysis shows that media here plays numerous roles.
Media initially plays an oppositional role by questioning the policy of air
campaign, however, policy makers consistently complied with air action
line without considering much about critical coverage. Moreover, CNN
coverage evidently supported it. From the perspective of the policy-
media interaction model, the existence of hybrid reports, united with the
certainty of policies, implies that CNN is unlikely to have a strong effect
under such circumstances.
Rather, instead of compelling policy decision, sympathetic coverage of
refugees and the wider devastation of war show that even if the media
does not have a significant impact on changing policy makers’ positions,
it can play a different role. By emotional reporting on refugees, it could
have provided a useful element in enabling policymakers validates
their decisions (Robinson, 2002, p.107). Precisely, the mass approval
can be consolidated throughout media images to realize the necessity
and importance of air campaign. In addition, the fear of emotive press
coverage of casualties regarded as a restraining force on US policy
makers should be contemplated (Robinson, 2002). Freedman (2000,
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