decision to guard Gorazde succeeding the collapse of Srebrenica. First
and foremost, it should be noted that western leaders’ primary policy
objective was the determination to avoid sending ground troops to
impede this aggression (Carruthers, 2011). Moreover, Robinson (2002,
p.75) pointed out that the UN finally endorsed air power against the
assaulters until Bosnia Serb nationalists took UNPROFOR personnel
hostage and two allegedly ‘safe areas’ captured by Serbian forces.
Meanwhile, it is necessary to be acknowledged that the final decision to
guard the Gorazde ‘safe area’ is the combination of policy uncertainty,
namely, the absence of certain policy and command of the operation
of force, and critical and sympathizing media reporting, which could be
regarded as the catalyst to threaten US government to practice airstrikes
in pursuing a humanitarian objective (Robinson, 2002). The following
contents will clarify both in turn.
Following the fall of Srebrenica, the United States administration was in
a difficult position as to whether to take action to retake Srebrenica or to
guarantee sufficient defense of other “safe areas”, also official statements
during the crisis specified that there was no policy on the deployment of
force and policy uncertainty thus potentially survived during the period
(Robinson, 2002, p. 78). For example, Robinson (2000, p. 622; p. 623)
validated from the White House Press Briefing on 11 July and 18 July
1995, ‘What is the point of the President going to Denver and making a
public pledge to rescue peacemakers in danger when the first and most
prominent case of that comes up and no one in this administration can
say whether or not this is what he was talking about?’. This remark a
journalist made to which official’s consistent ambiguous and deflected
response indicates the executive fails to articulate a certain policy on
whether better action would be commissioned to protect the threatened
Gorazde ‘safe area’. Likewise, ‘It’s not useful at this point to speculate on
any possible military action in connection with strengthening UNPRFOR
because there is a lot of speculation out there that, frankly, right now
is inaccurate’, which provides the sign of the absence of policy line
concerning the employment of military. Moreover, Holbrooke (1998,
p.72) stated that although the discussions to ‘draw a line’ at Gorazde
were ongoing during the fall of Srebrenica, there existed no ultimate
specific outcome on safeguarding Gorazde. In short, the analysis of
official announcements suggests the certain predicament the policy
of US was uncertain about the deployment of force to guard Gorazde,
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