SotA Anthology 2015-16 | Page 115

PHIL302 the potential to allow in marginal cases, plants and ecosystems. Consider the following scenario: An astronaut named Hank has visited countless planets and found no signs of life. He has surveyed 99 per cent of the ground on a particular grey, dusty, sand dune of a planet, when he comes across a green plant-like organism with a purple flower. Hank grabs the flowering plant and pulls it out of the ground to look at it more closely. He then drops it on the floor and walks on. arises from it having no teleological goals other than that of the individual members. Many would contend that ecosystems can flourish and can be harmed. But as Cahen (1988) argues, the overall effect of an ecosystem flourishing cannot be proven to be goal-directed or driven by the community interest. The equilibrium and stability reached by a particular system is a The actions of Hank the astronaut are wrong because the plant has moral standing and deserves not to be treated in that way. The flower has intrinsic value and has been harmed by being denied the chance to pursue its interests: “the full development of its biological powers,” (Taylor, 1986, p. 84). It follows from the criteria we are using that this is an injustice. Whether it is one plant or a whole rainforest, we can see that the interests of non-sentient organisms should not be harmed. The problem for the inclusion of ecosystems 115 by-product of individualistic behaviour. Each entity is striving to achieve its own flourishing through a dynamic interaction with its environment. Therefore, if an ecosystem can have no goals in itself, then justice cannot apply to it. It is further argued by Cahen that ‘organismic ecology’ no longer has the standing amongst ecologists and evolutionary biologists it once did; the prevailing thought is individualistic rather than group selection.