2010 showed that 33% of Somalis believed AMISOM was in Somalia to cause harm, 23
months later, in December 2011, polling saw a notable drop in this negativity – only 9% of
respondents thought poorly of AMISOM. Months later, March-April 2013 polling revealed
that now nearly 60% of Somalis considered AMISOM effective at providing security, with
most respondents viewing AMISOM as a friendly force. Despite this remarkable progress in
just three years of IST/AMISOM operations, the AU-UN strategic messaging campaign soon
took a downward turn. The major external factors for this decline were: (1) new tasking
procedures from the UN that stifled IST’s ability to generate its own work plans; (2) new
focus on outputs (T-shirts, bags, calendars, etc.) rather than on effects (from messaging);
and, (3) new coordination arrangements whereby the IST could no longer advise AMISOM
but could instead only respond to AMISOM requests. As a result, the decline in messaging
effectiveness was sharp. June-July 2016 polling showed only 28% of Somalis in support of
AMISOM, 55% viewed AMISOM as an unfriendly force, and 48% wanted AMISOM to leave
immediately. Besides the stifled messaging activities, criticism over human rights abuses by
AMISOM personnel was frequent/prominent, and, to a degree, AMISOM shot itself in the
foot due to its own misconduct.
Besides the three external factors, other major challenges to the IST’s work emerged in
2013 and continued for several years – reversing the gains made by the IST in its early
years. Those major, perpetual challenges were: (1) the hostile operating environment in
Somalia (and lack of AMISOM risk-taking for messaging access/outreach); (2) reluctance
on the part of AMISOM’s leaders – particularly senior civilians – to shoulder their responsi-
bilities listed in the strategic communication plan; (3) TCCs of AMISOM pursuing their own
national communication goals over the larger AMISOM goals and routinely ignoring IST
advice/expertise; (4) TCCs of AMISOM putting out false information (lies) – thereby
damaging AMISOM’s credibility; (5) lack of initiative or urgency by AMISOM to counter
al-Shabaab messaging or exploit al-Shabaab missteps; and, (6) IST organizational
challenges, including limited resources and high personnel turnover. Because of these
major challenges and leadership failure to address them, the AU-UN strategic messaging
in Somalia was h andicapped for years.
Recommendations.
The author of the article upon which this lesson is based makes the following four
recommendations:
1) Deploying a peace operation without the capabilities to wage an effective strategic
communications campaign would be a major error. The precise nature of the
strategic communications capabilities should be constituted in accordance with the
needs on the ground.
2) Leadership must ensure coherence between a clear vision and sound policy –
to guide strategic communications. Leadership should clearly articulate the desired
effects and clarify how particular audiences can be influenced to support the
mission’s goals. Moreover, as seen in AMISOM’s case, it is not enough to devise
a coherent policy; it must also be followed and implemented by the countries
contributing to the mission.
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