When South Sudan attained its independence in July 2011, significant humanitarian and development challenges remained. In the GOSS-published “South
Sudan Development Plan 2011-2013,” the government reported that the
mortality rate was over 2%, the country had only one qualified midwife per
30,000 people, only 13% of all teachers were qualified; the teacher-to-student
ratio in schools was 1-to-117, and the health centers throughout the country were
plagued by lack of equipment and medicines.
Donors were aware that meeting these acute challenges required coordinated
action. Five primary "multi-donor funds" were therefore created to provide
funding for the various requirements. These funds were: the Multi-Donor Trust
Fund (MDTF); the Capacity Building Trust Fund (CBTF); the Basic Services Fund
(BSF); the Common Humanitarian Fund (CHF); and, the Sudan Recovery Fund
(SRF). The MDTF and CBTF were aimed at renovating government buildings,
providing new infrastructure, and developing long-term capacity of the GOSS.
The BSF and SRF were designed to provide basic services and to fund community projects to showcase the dividends of peace. The CHF was established to
provide funding for emergency relief. With regard to the MDTF, disbursement of
funds was extremely slow because the GOSS was unable to meet requirements/
timelines of the World Bank, which caused donors to then channel funds away
from the MDTF and into the BSF and SRF (which had short-term objectives).
Additionally, NGOs then implemented the BSF and SRF projects through Project
Implementation Units, which provided immediate or short-term results, but were
not coordinated with/through the government. The government typically gained
no knowledge or expertise on service provision. This adversely affected longterm sustainability of services.
In hindsight, international donor investment in South Sudan had 3 other major
shortcomings: (1) Donors failed to engage in security sector development –
transformation that was sorely needed for improving/professionalizing state
security capacity and for reducing incentives for organized violence. Donors
employed minimal peacebuilding measures, such as workshops and intercommunal meetings; however, they lacked follow-up, implementation, and assessment mechanisms. Not surprisingly, ethnic/tribal/factional conflicts continued,
and many local elders and chiefs lost control over youths who resorted to acts of
violence. (2) Donors and the GOSS also failed to involve lower/local tiers of
governance in development planning. When building the South Sudan Development Plan in 2011, only three days were spent on consultations with the 10
states, 79 counties, and hundreds of lower administrative units, and there was
little to no coordination thereafter. (3) Donors unintentionally diverted talent/
personnel away from the government sector, due to the high salaries that donors
paid relative to what the government was paying its civil servants.
Additionally, the lack of experience and governance-related training & education
on the part of South Sudan’s political leaders – and the lack of international or
regional programs to mentor them – contributed to their inability to handle the
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