leaders, the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), the United
Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) – which was providing education for children
within the internally displaced persons (IDP) camps – and several other nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). With so many families living in IDP camps,
the stakeholders agreed that returning children to schools would take precedence over various other reconstruction projects. The CA team was then able to
smoothly facilitate the provision of resources for, and engage in the process
of, building new classrooms, school administration buildings, teachers' quarters,
and school storage areas. Throughout this process, synergy was maintained
from those initial contacts and the early prioritization of efforts.
Over the course of the CA teams' 2-year tenure in the Rift Valley, maintaining
clear lines of communication with key host nation (HN)/local stakeholders proved
imperative for maintaining community support/assistance. When CA teams had
to conduct multiple assessment visits at a certain site before beginning work, it
was important to convey to community leaders the necessity of these visits and
when work could actually begin. On any given school project, if there were a lag
in construction due to resource delays, as long as the community leaders were
given timely explanations, they remained supportive. The same went for delays
or diversions of funds. Being open and transparent with local leaders precluded
disappointment or discontent, and they then willingly provided support/assistance
for the work when it could resume. Upon completion of project, upon the team's
departure from the area, a closure discussion with local village leaders allowed
them to realize that the team was departing and to understand the status of the
project – completed or pending additional work from another team.
Interviews with Kenyans in the Rift Valley did reveal a degree of disappointment
with their own military. Although the Kenyan military was actively engaged in
certain post-conflict work within the Rift Valley – such as securing major
roadways and providing support for local police activities – there was only brief
collaboration with the U.S. CA personnel during the initial phase of school
reconstruction. Afterwards, the Kenyan military was largely absent. This was a
lost opportunity for the Kenyan military to do something visible and meaningful
for the community, as well as a lost opportunity for citizens to gain some trust
and confidence in their military – which a great number of Kenyans had
mistrusted, or even feared. If "partnering" with the Kenyan military would have
been an objective for the CA teams, local civilian views of the Kenyan military
and government could have been positively impacted. Kenyan military units
could have profited professionally from the experience of working with the U.S.
military teams. Also, greater Kenyan "ownership" of the projects could have
been promulgated – from start to finish.
Recommendation.
1. U.S. military teams engaged in civil-military operations / humanitarian
assistance should establish contacts and relationships upfront with key stakeTable of Contents | Quick Look | Contact PKSOI
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