From the outset, JTF-Haiti planners and leaders worked alongside counterparts
from the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH), USAID, and
non-governmental organizations (NGOs). Together they developed plans for
protecting internally displaced persons (IDPs) in makeshift camp – who were
at great risk of further disaster due to the impending hurricane season and
potential flooding. In February and early March, JTF-Haiti elements conducted
comprehensive infrastructure assessments and then executed engineering
projects – with the UN and NGOs – to mitigate the risk and reduce the number
of people requiring relocation. Then, from mid-March through mid-May, JTF-Haiti
supported the Haitian government, UN, USAID, and NGO partners by relocating
IDPs from sites still at risk to transitional resettlement sites.
JTF-Haiti's Maritime Component Command, comprised of the 22nd and 24th
Marine Expeditionary Units, conducted relief missions outside Port-au-Prince,
to the west and to the north. Using the flexibility inherent in amphibious forces,
these units brought relief to thousands of Haitians in the outlying regions.
Although the deployment of U.S. military forces and U.S. resources was quick
and effective, it was not always efficient. The most significant challenge to the
U.S. military – and to the international community – was logistics. Three specific
areas presented major challenges to JTF-Haiti's logistical operations (and those
of the international players):
"Incomplete situational awareness" at the outset made it difficult to
determine requirements and priorities for providing relief and delivering
supplies.
The "lack of a unified and integrated logistics command and control
structure" led to gaps in reception, staging, and movement of forces,
equipment, and supplies into Haiti. Logistics staffs were not always
aware of many non-military activities and cargos.
The "initial reliance on the one single airport" (Toussaint Louverture
International Airport) for throughput, created the need to validate and
prioritize all flights (including international flights) to ensure that only
the most critical cargo landed.
JTF-Haiti had a proven logistical system to manage its own requirements;
however, it was not designed for managing external flights, requirements, cargo,
etc. In spite of this challenge, however, JTF-Haiti's airmen were able to increase
flights at the international airport from 13 per day (pre-quake) to a peak of 150
per day. However, even this capacity fell short of the demand. SOUTHCOM's
12th Air Force, in coordination with the UN, then developed a system of timeslots and priorities – driven by the Haitian government – that at least served to
meet Haiti's major requirements on a day-to-day basis.
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