- Geopolitical pressures. In early August, NATO offered support to the
government of Pakistan, including an air bridge. Representatives from the U.S.
and the United Kingdom advocated strongly for humanitarian agencies to use
this air bridge, as did officials form the government of Pakistan, claiming that this
would speed up delivery of relief supplies and reduce costs. In contrast, the
European Commission Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection department
(ECHO) took the position that if any of its implementing partners used NATO or
other military assets, they would be in breach of their contract. The UN HCT in
Pakistan also opposed use of the NATO air bridge. In spite of these pressures/
positions from ECHO and the UN HCT, the World Food Programme and the
UNHCR (the UN refugee agency) opted to use the NATO air bridge on a shortterm basis, as did a number of other non-governmental organizations (NGOs).
- Different approaches to security. Pakistani government authorities insisted
that armed escorts be used on many relief missions – especially those transiting
certain districts of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, Punjab, and Sindh. However, humanitarian agencies varied in their responses to the government's pressure to use
armed escorts – with some accepting the armed escorts, others seeking
exceptions from superiors, and others objecting outright and even suspending
operations. The ones who objected believed that use of armed escorts would
undermine long-term acceptance by local communities and place their staffs and
programs at risk. Complicating matters, while Pakistani national authorities
sometimes compromised with humanitarian agencies on the use of armed
escorts, lower-level/provincial authorities in Punjab and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa
insisted on the use of armed escorts. They also objected to aid delivery by
expatriates and generally did not work cooperatively with humanitarian actors.
- Disagreement over how the crisis was characterized. One of the central
issues that emerged from the 2010 Pakistan floods was that it matters how a
crisis is characterized. Some international organizations saw themselves as
responding to a purely "natural disaster," so they followed the 2007 "Oslo Guidelines" (guidelines which apply to natural disasters in times of peace). Other
international organizations saw themselves as responding to a "complex
emergency" in which both the Pakistan national military and NATO were
perceived to be parties to a conflict; they tended to follow the 2003 "MCDA
Guidelines" (Guidelines on the Use of Military and Civil Defence Assets to
Support United Nations Humanitarian Complex Emergencies). Still other
international organizations saw themselves as responding to a "natural disaster
within a complex emergency" (for which there are no international guidelines);
they tended to follow the "Draft Guidelines for Civil-military Coordination in
Pakistan" or responded in ways that their individual organization deemed
appropriate. Similarly, local NGOs also had diverse attitudes and approaches for
coordinating with the military. Some showed little concern about the heavy
involvement of the Pakistan military in orchestrating relief operations; they
routinely coordinated with the military on access issues. Other local NGOs,
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