new Panama National Police (PNP) personnel became available, the U.S. military
began to conduct joint patrols with them. At first the U.S. Army personnel were
mostly general-purpose forces (GPF), and included a minority of MPs and reservists/
National Guard who were police in civilian life. [However] the GPF were untrained for the
tasks of either providing law and order or partnering with local forces. (Jayamaha, p.
22)
For some units, the adjustment from warrior to police officer or mayor caused serious
problems, especially when restrictive rules of engagement (ROE) for combat were
replaced by even more highly restrictive ROE for the stability operations that followed.…
That most U.S. combat units had not been prepared to conduct stability operations was
seen as a shortcoming in the planning and preparation for the invasion… (Yates, p. 51)
Concurrent with the joint patrolling, the U.S. military established the U.S. Forces Liaison
Group (USFLG) and Judicial Liaison Group (JLG) to take on the work of training and
setting up a new host nation police force and judicial system (i.e., “reestablish host nation
law enforcement capacity”).
The [selected] option was to use the former PDF members to reconstitute the police
force. This would allow for a Panamanian force to quickly restore order and allow the
U.S. forces to assume a secondary, less visible role in Panamanian internal affairs. …
The new Endara government in concert with the U.S. mentors agreed that with proper
screening the PDF could be used as a basis from which the new police force would be
created. (Conley, pp. 32-33)
The U.S. Forces Liaison Group (USFLG) assisted the Panamanian government in
setting up the Panamanian Fuerza Publica (Public Force) and oversaw its division into
the PNP, air service and maritime service, investigative arm, immigration service, port
police, presidential guard, and prison guards. The USFLG ensured that the Public Force
began to deploy vetted forces by the end of January 1990. … one of the USFLG’s first
activities under its key task of addressing enforcement and maintenance of law and order
was to develop a basic 20-hour curriculum for a transition training course for the HN
forces, … The development of the course by the USFLG was not ideal, but the staff
found reservists who were police officers in their civilian lives to help shape it.
As a means of reconstituting the PNP, [SOUTHCOM’s] Military Support Group (MSG)
used MPs to administer the 20-hour basic police training course to PNP personnel.
[However] In February 1990, Congress invoked the Section 660 of the Foreign Assistance
Act (FAA) of 1961 which limits U.S. assistance for the training of foreign police, causing
the military to curtail the training of the PNP. The U.S. military continued to mentor the
PNP under an FAA Section 660 provision that permitted the use of residual security
assistance funds to equip a police force. The MSG was left in a difficult situation – with no
civilians to transition the mission to and restricted authority for providing direct support to
police efforts in Panama, the urgency to find a civilian answer increased. The DoS [then]
approached the [DoJ’s] ICITAP to advise and support the transition of the former PDF
into the new PNP. …[and] the ICITAP’s role was broadened through a special congres-
sional authorization in February 1990, allowing the agency to implement a comprehensive
reconstitution and training program for the PNP. (Jayamaha pp. 23-25)
The USG’s work of reestablishing host nation law enforcement capacity thus went under
civilian leadership. The DoJ’s ICITAP implemented the “reconstitution and training program”
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