having to start from scratch training Iraqi police units – using individuals with no experience
and little capability to provide for their own security.
In addition to providing for basic security, other means for reducing violence must include
ensuring an equitable distribution of humanitarian assistance resources such as food, water,
medical support, power generation, and shelter requirements. This encourages a sense of
fairness throughout the population. This was also an issue in southern Iraq in 2003 (where I
was initially located), because the population in southern Iraq was watching hundreds of
convoys passing through their region on their way to Baghdad while the southern population
was left with far less in support and assistance. This was a significant issue – the “Baghdad
first” approach that was taken.
Recommendations:
Some suggestions for post-hostility security, reducing violence, and stabilizing a society:
1. Think through the long term ramifications of completely disbanding established
security force capability (e.g., de-Baathification in Iraq) before taking such a radical
step. Are rank and file officers really part of the displaced regime? Can they be
"salvaged" and re-trained under a new rule of law philosophy?
2. Plan thoroughly for "Phase IV" operations and plan accordingly for suitable and suffi-
cient resources capable of securing the entire population and holding terrain until such
time that a logical and responsible transition to a new government can take place.
3. If there is neither the will nor the resources to execute a successful Phase IV
campaign, then strongly recommend modification to the desired end-state and
objectives of the "Hostilities" phase of the campaign. It seems that as a general rule
of thumb, if the desired end-state is something that resembles regime change, then
you need to plan for a fully resourced, comprehensive "Post-Hostilities" phase that
includes a COIN capability should the situation develop into an insurgency.
4. Allow population to retain small arms weapons for personal protection, an accepted
practice in international peace operations.
Implications:
Remembering lessons learned from an under-resourced post-conflict campaign during OIF,
the following implications are possible:
Significant challenges re-establishing rule of law institutions
Fueling support for an insurgency due to an inability to provide for the basic
security needs of the indigenous population
Related challenges to establishing economic and political institutions necessary
to address the basic needs of the society
Sources:
This lesson is based on personal experience as a company commander in theater during
Operation Iraqi Freedom I and II and insights gained during the PKSOI Elective Course
PS2219 taken at the United States Army War College (USAWC).
Lesson Author: LTC Timothy Connelly – while a student at USAWC.
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