2+ years into the stability operation (March 2004), USIP gave this account of the warlords:
They have refused to disband their private armies, and routinely engage in armed
clashes over control of territory, border crossings, and transportation routes. [… but
seriously, why would they disband their private armies? In doing so, they would lose
power.] They (warlords) also use intimidation and violence to control the local popula-
tion, and rely upon criminal activities including narcotics trafficking and extortion to
finance their activities. In many cases, the most senior warlords serve as provincial
governors or hold other official positions, but refuse to accept direction from or provide
revenue to the central government. [… again, though, why would they accept direction
from a central government that they traditionally have not trusted or respected?] The
problem of regional warlords is particularly serious in the north, where ethnic divisions
and personal rivalries among commanders persist. (Miller and Perito, p. 15.)
Again, there were no cooperative agreements gained from / inclusive of the many warlords
(no arrangements for de-centralization of power), nor any terms with (or “nominal” inclusion
granted to) the ousted Taliban through any peace agreement. So …
Nearly two years after their defeat by U.S. and allied Northern Alliance forces (2004),
the Taliban has re-emerged as a growing security threat along Afghanistan’s southeastern
border with Pakistan. Taliban forces have staged attacks and have tried to regain political
influence in Pashtun areas. … al Qaeda’s training camps in Afghanistan have been
destroyed and a substantial proportion of its cadre eliminated, but it retains the capacity to
conduct military operations. From sanctuaries in Pakistan’s lawless tribal areas, bands
of al Qaeda extremists have staged cross-border raids on U.S. bases. At the same time,
forces loyal to renegade militia commander Gulbuddin Hekmatyar operate in the northern
border provinces of Kunar and Nuristan, where they have declared their own jihad against
the United States and Coalition forces. Taliban insurgents have also attacked and killed
foreign aid workers, Afghan police, and road crews. These events have caused a dramatic
scaling back by international agencies, and a consequent lack of capacity to provide
assistance to a significant portion of the country. (Miller and Perito, pp. 14-15.)
Public order was dependent on the local power-holders/warlords. The Coalition should have
worked by, with, and through them … because:
In most of the country, regional power holders – whether they hold official positions
or not – exercise political, police, and judicial authority through their control of militia
forces. (Miller and Perito, p. 3.)
During the past decades of conflict there has been no national civilian police force in
Afghanistan. Though figures are uncertain, there are estimated to be about 50,000 men
working as police, but they are generally untrained, ill-equipped, illiterate (70-90%), and
owe their allegiance to local warlords and militia commanders and not to the central
government. (Miller and Perito, p. 10.)
Likewise, law and justice were dependent on the local, traditional system of justice. The
Coalition should have worked by, with, and through it.
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