SOLLIMS Sampler Special Edition, May 2017 | Page 8

the previous night – and was far more one sided. Dinka fighters along with
personnel “in SPLA uniforms” then largely had free reign across much of the
camp for at least several hours, firing on Nuer and Shilluk civilians and burning
their homes. By 2 p.m., large sections of the camp were reduced to ashes.
2,326 structures were destroyed by fire (around 35% of existing shelters in the
POC), the IOM and IMC humanitarian clinics inside the camp were destroyed,
three schools were destroyed, and latrines and water storage infrastructure were
damaged. UNMISS forces finally intervened at approximately 3:45 p.m. The
fighting ended at 4 p.m. The violence at Malakal POC site resulted in at least
144 civilian casualties (CIVCAS), including at least 25 deaths.
UNMISS’ lack of action / leadership failure prior to 16 February 2016:
- On 8 February, the UN Protection Cluster went to UNMISS civilian
leadership to express their concerns about escalating violence within the
Malakal POC site, and to ask that a risk mitigation plan be developed.
UNMISS leadership in Malakal did not take action on this.
- One week before the 16 February incident, a humanitarian agency
became aware that part of the fence in Sector 2 of Malakal POC had been
cut. It passed this information to UNMISS leadership. However, nothing
was done to fix the fence deficiency.
- A humanitarian agency recognized the scale of the weapons-smuggling
problem at Malakal POC and reported this to UNMISS leadership.
UNMISS leadership failed to take action.
- A humanitarian agency informed UNMISS leadership that Malakal POC
site was getting very tense days before the 16 February clashes. This
report was disregarded.
- Gate security at Malakal POC was being handled by contractors.
UNMISS’s Department of Safety and Security (DSS) had contracted
Warrior Security, a South Sudanese company, for gate security. One
could ask, “Why weren’t UNMISS personnel, particularly police personnel,
handling gate security?”
UNMISS’ lack of action / leadership failure on 17 and 18 February:
- In the late morning of 17 February, several Nuer and Shilluk leaders met
with UNMISS leadership to express their concerns about guns within the
Dinka section of the camp and about the two men who attempted to enter
Juliet Gate with rifle magazines the previous day, aided by other men “in
SPLA uniforms.” UNMISS leadership failed to act on these concerns.
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