Riley Bennett Egloff Magazine July Magazine | Page 6

complies with the Act’s provisions. 17 If the negligence alleged does not fall within the purview of the Act, then
the provider defendant is not entitled to the Act’s above protections.
Imagine a situation where a patient falls while hospitalized and sustains a subdural hematoma with permanent
loss of cognitive function. The jury determines the patient’s economic and noneconomic damages total
$3,000,000. If that fall occurred because the patient was a known fall risk and fell as a result of the health care
provider’s failure to implement fall prevention interventions (which requires an exercise of medical/nursing
judgment), then the Act would apply and the provider’s exposure would be capped at $400,000. However, if
the patient fell as a result of water being allowed to accumulate on the floor (a defect in the premises), the Act
would not apply and the provider’s exposure would be $3,000,000. Quite simply, the Act’s impact on the liability
of a provider can be significant.
Given the potential (and possibly significant) disparity in the amount of damages available to a plaintiff in an
ordinary negligence action versus a medical malpractice action, it is important for providers and their attorneys
to understand when the Act applies so that appropriate procedural action can be taken against a complaint
inappropriately filed in court under the guise of an ordinary negligence action. Asking a few simple questions at
the start of litigation – such as “Does the plaintiff question the health care decisions of the provider?” and “Were
the plaintiff’s injuries the result of equipment failure or an improperly-maintained premises?” – could avoid a
provider’s exposure to potentially excessive jury awards.
_____________________________
1 Indiana Code § 34-18-2-13.
2 Madison Center, Inc. v. R.R.K., 853 N.E.2d 1286, 1288 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006).
3 Doe by Roe, 652 N.E.2d at 104. See also Winona Hospital, Ltd. Partnership v. Kuester, 737 N.E.2d 824, 828 (Ind. Ct.
App. 2000); Howard Regional Health System v. Gordon, 952 N.E.2 183, 185 (Ind. 2011). Anonymous Hospital, Inc. v. Doe,
996 N.E.2d 329, 333-34 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013).
4 Methodist Hospital of Indiana, Inc. v. Rioux, 483 N.E.2d 315, 316-17.
5 619 N.E.2d 968, 971-72 (Ind. Ct. App. 1993).
6 Id. at 971.
7 553 N.E.2d 874, 878-79 (Ind. Ct. App. 990).
8 465 N.E.2d at 740-42. See also Harts, 553 N.E.2d at 874.
9 Caylor-Nickel, 553 N.E.2d at 879.
10 Id.
11 Winona, 465 N.E.2d at 732.
12 Id. at 733, 740-42.
13 705 N.E.2d 1035 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999).
14 Id. at 1037-38.
15 Sells , 619 N.E.2d at 970.
16 In comparison a general liability claim is governed by Indiana’s Comparative Fault Act such that a percentage of fault
allocated to Plaintiff by the jury will reduce Plaintiff ’s recovery, but not necessarily bar Plaintiff ’s recovery. Cavens v. Zaber-
dac, 849 N.E.2d 526, 528-29 (Ind. 2006).
17 Ind. Code § 34-18-14-4.
6
Riley Bennett Egloff LLP - April 2018