Interestingly, while in its 2003 report, the Law Commission proposed the repeal of cl 1 such that would entitle the parties to exercise the appointment provisions in art 11(3) of sch 1, AMINZ argued that the default appointment process was an efficient means of avoiding delay and disputation in the appointment process. That has certainly been our experience as a Registry over the past 22 years, and in particular, my experience as an arbitrator having accepted an appointment pursuant to the default appointment procedures in what has become the seminal case on this point: Hitex Plastering Ltd v Santa Barbara Homes Ltd [2002] 3 NZLR 695 (HC). The application and utility of the default appointment procedures cl 1(4) is clearly illustrated by the judgment of Rodney Hansen J in Hitex. Hitex and Santa Barbara fell into dispute over a contract for the supply and installation of exterior cladding by Hitex that required the parties to submit any such dispute to arbitration (this was before the Construction Contracts Act 2002 came into force, so adjudication was not an option back then). The parties were unable to agree on the appointment of an arbitrator. Each party proposed a different person. In order to secure the appointment of an arbitral tribunal in the face of such disagreement, Hitex issued a default notice requiring Santa Barbara to remedy its default (that is, the failure to agree) by accepting me as its proposed arbitrator within seven days. After the expiry of the initial notice period, Hitex sent a further notice to Santa Barbara to the effect that its proposed appointment had now taken effect. I accepted the appointment. Despite my best endeavours, Santa Barbara refused to participate in the arbitration and subsequently opposed enforcement of my award on the ground that the arbitral tribunal was invalidly appointed. The Court reviewed the appointment procedures and the inter-relationship between article 11 of Schedule 1 and clause 1 of Schedule 2 and concluded they were intended to provide separate and mutually exclusive procedures for the appointment of arbitrators in the event of default or disagreement. The Court determined that the parties' inability to agree on an arbitrator amounted to a default for the purpose of cl 1(4). At [28] Rodney Hansen J held: [art 11 of Schedule 1] and [cl 1 of Schedule 2] were intended to provide separate and mutually exclusive procedures for appointment of arbitrators in the event of ‘default’ or disagreement. Resort to the Court under [art 11] is not available where, by virtue of [cl1(1) of Schedule 2] the procedures in subcls (4) and (5) apply. The Schedule 2 default appointment procedure simply requires a genuine attempt to reach agreement. At [29] his Honour noted: Anyone who peremptorily issues a notice of default without making a reasonable attempt to resolve differences will risk a successful challenge to any appointment which ensues. In the event that parties disagree as to the composition of the arbitral tribunal, Party A simply needs to issue a notice of default to Party B. That notice of default needs to specify the details of Party B’s default (being the failure to agree on the appointment of an arbitrator) and propose that, if that default is not remedied within a specific period of time (to be not less than seven days after service of the notice of default), the individual named in the communication shall be appointed as arbitrator with respect to the dispute between Party A and Party B. Nothing further is required to be done.