ReSolution Issue 17, May 2018 | Page 17

iii. Retail 3 at value of $447,500 (‘the properties’).
The properties will be transfered (sic) in fee simple after discharge of the construction funding facility.
The defendants submitted that the essential terms of the settlement were contained in the document and were sufficiently clear. Conversely, the plaintiff submitted that there was no intention on its part to be immediately bound by the terms, and that the agreement failed to include various essential terms applicable to a transfer of land. The plaintiff asserted that the missing elements included the following:
◦ There were no arrangements regarding any deposit to be paid and held.
◦ There was no reference to any plan that identified the properties to be sold (as the properties were only a part of a development).
◦ There was no explanation of what the 'construction funding facility' was.
◦ If the settlement terms were binding, they amounted to a sale of land, and the settlement agreement failed to comply with the relevant Victorian Sale of Land Act.
The Court’s finding
On the subject of whether the settlement terms were immediately binding, Justice Almond had to consider whether the terms fell within the one of the limbs of the well-known decision of Masters v Cameron[2], namely:
First, the parties may have reached finality in arranging all the terms of their bargain and intend to be immediately bound to the performance of those terms but at the same time propose to have the terms restated in a form which will be fuller or more precise but not different in effect.
Second, the parties may have completely agreed upon all the terms of their bargain and intend no departure from or addition to that which their agreed terms express or imply, but nevertheless have made performance of one or more of them conditional upon the execution of the formal document.
Third, the parties may intend not to make a concluded bargain at all unless and until they execute a formal contract.
A fourth 'limb' has been subsequently identified in Sinclair, Scott & Co v Naughton[3], namely “….one in which the parties were content to be bound immediately and exclusively by the terms which they had agreed upon whilst expecting to make a further contract in substitution for the first contract, containing, by consent, additional terms”.