Decision The Court found in Glencore’s favour, ultimately finding that service had not been effected. The Court considered section 76(3) of the Arbitration Act, which provides that ‘a notice or other document may be served on a person by any effective means’, concluding that e-mail can be an effective means of serving a notice or other document. The Court then went on to consider the principles of agency. Glencore described Mr Oosterman as a ‘junior back office employee’ who had a very limited role in charter operations once a charter was fixed. In assessing his authority to accept service the Court considered evidence including Mr Oosterman’s employment contract, personnel file, and social media which described his position, including LinkedIn. Glencore asserted Mr Oosterman had no actual or ostensible authority to accept service on its behalf, and that none of the communications from Conqueror were passed onto or seen by Glencore’s legal department, and accordingly there was no valid service. Conqueror argued that agency principles were irrelevant, as the service was to a Glencore email address and so on the claimant itself. The Court distinguished service on an email address which is a personal business address of an individual, from one which is a generic business address. The Court held that ‘whether it constitutes good service if directed to an individual’s email address must depend on the particular role which the named individual plays or is held out as playing within the organisation.’ The Court drew a distinction between service on an employee who could reasonably be considered to be involved in dispute handling, compared to an employee in an operational role. In the present case, Conqueror had no reason to suppose that Mr Oosterman had conduct of the dispute once it arose. Beyond the emails he sent, there was no reason to believe he had any further involvement. Conqueror’s further argument that it could not have known the email address for Glencore’s legal department because it was not on the website was rejected: ‘Conqueror was not put at any disadvantage if it did not know the legal department email address. It could have asked through the broking channel to whom the notice should be addressed’. The Court also made clear that despite whatever difficulties may arise in relation to service by email, per s76(4) of the Arbitration Act it is always possible to effect service by post to a registered or principal office. The Court determined that Mr Oosterman did not have express, implied, or ostensible authority to accept service. The Court concluded that Mr Oosterman’s lack of involvement after a dispute had arisen provided a clear picture of his having, at the highest, a purely operational role in the department with…no dispute handling function. There is no basis for finding that Mr Oosterman was expressly authorised to accept service of arbitral proceedings and all the available evidence suggests the opposite. Despite their finding, the Court was careful not to impose strict rules relating to service by email on individual as opposed to generic email addresses: ‘there will be cases where the company has promulgated a generic email address which will be sufficient…There will be cases in which the role of any individual will justify notification to his individual email address. But it does not follow that sending an email to someone who has an operational role, rather than dispute handing or dispute resolution role, must be sufficient’.