delegate any part of his decision making duties to a third party: [48]. Clearly, the arbitrator did not have this power. While the arbitrator expressed a view in the award that the parties may find determination elsewhere, “the arbitrator’s view inCroft J considered that the key to the resolution of the proceeding was the proper characterisation of the award: [59]. Under s 32 of the CAA, an arbitral tribunal is functus officio upon delivery of a final award, subject to s 33 (allowing for correction, interpretation and an additional award) and s 34 (which allows the Court to remit an award upon a setting aside application for the purposes of removing the ground for setting aside). Notwithstanding that it was a styled a “Final Award”, properly considered, it was not a final award for the purposes of the CAA because it didn’t deal with all of the issues referred to arbitration. Croft J held that a deliberate and articulated decision by an arbitrator not to deal with all issues which are within the arbitral mandate does not produce a final award: [62]. Even if the award was a final award and the arbitrator was functus officio, s 33(5) of the CAA provided a mechanism for B to seek an additional award on the unresolved issue within 30 days. On an application under s 33(5), an arbitrator may hear further evidence and take further submissions. Croft J considered that the power to grant an additional award under s 33(5) applies to inadvertent omissions by an arbitral tribunal. On the other hand, the conscious and deliberate decision by an arbitral tribunal not to deal with an issue (as in the present case) leaves the arbitral tribunal with an undischarged mandate which does not require the assistance of s 33(5): [24]. Thus, the fact that B had not availed itself of the mechanism in s 33(5), within the time limited by that sub-section, was of no consequence. B sought to set aside part of the award under s 34(2)(a)(iii) of the CAA, which empowers the supervising court to set aside an award insofar as it contains decisions on matters beyond the scope of the submission to arbitration. Croft J noted that there was some confusion in B’s submissions regarding the identity of the decision that it sought to set aside: [45]. Here, there was no relevant decision on matters beyond the scope of the submission to arbitration for the purposes of s 34(2)(a)(iii). The arbitrator had not gone beyond his mandate. Indeed, he did not discharge his whole mandate. As the award, properly characterised, was not a final award (and did not preclude determination of the remaining issue by arbitration), there was no basis for setting aside any part of the award on the grounds that the arbitrator had failed to determine a relevant claim: [58]. As an aside, Croft J noted that a decision not to make a decision is not a decision that may be set aside under s 34(2)(a)(iii) of the CAA, as that section applies to decisions that exceed the tribunal’s jurisdiction, not decisions which do not: [49]. In that regard, Croft J compared Article 34 of the Model Law with s 68(2)(d) of the Arbitration Act 1996 (UK). The latter specifically empowers the supervising court to set aside an award in circumstances where a tribunal fails to deal with all the issues referred to it. No equivalent provision is to be found in the Model Law: [28].