An Analysis of the Relationship between National Courts and the Court of
Justice of the European Union – Shifting from Cooperation to Superiority
other’s legal traditions and fundamental principles. It is likely that this
method is capable of resolving the current problems in the preliminary
ruling procedure, as supported by Kenny (2012: 448).
Is the CJEU Superior to National Courts?
It appears that national courts are not always eager to engage in a cooperative dialogue with the CJEU. However, it should be pointed out that the
CJEU itself has also departed from the cooperative manner. By defining
the mode of cooperation, it has positioned itself as a superior court. Although it is widely accepted that the decision, whether or not to refer, is
entirely at the discretion of the national courts, the CJEU has placed certain restrictions on this discretion. More importantly, when introducing
new concepts, it does not consult with national courts, but simply imposes its novel approach. For instance, it introduced the Acte Éclaire5 doctrine in Da Costa en Schaake NV, Jacob Meijer NV and Hoechst-Holland
NV n Nederlandse Belastingadministratie [1963]; according to which if
the question has already been answered in a previous ruling, the national
court is not obliged to refer. Consequently, it extended the principle in
Srl CILFIT and Lanificio di Govardo SpA v Ministry of Health [1982] by
declaring that if the interpretation of EU law is so obvious that it leaves
no reasonable doubt, the obligation to make a reference is suspended.
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Tridimas (2003: 12) described this approach as evolutionary in the relationship between CJEU and national courts, because the CJEU uses it to
“establish the normative value of its ruling (