Theories of Democratic Consolidation: A Mexico-Germany Comparison
agency. Building on the modernisation debate, Przeworski and Limongi
found that while “the chances for the survival of democracy are greater
when the country is richer” (1997: 177), economic development is not
a causal factor in areas where democracy has not already risen. With
reference to O’Donnell and Schmitter (1986), they further state that: “democracy is or is not established by political actors pursuing their goals”
(1997: 177).
In order to accommodate a higher degree of agency, this article denotes
political commitment as the willingness of a country’s political elite to
consolidate democracy. Political commitment is sometimes driven by
pressure from its public counterpart. If political commitment does not
react to public pressure, this may ultimately result in uprising or revolution; with a successful revolution then resulting in a change of the
political elite. However, this pressure can also be inversed. The elite can
either seek to oppress or enhance democratic practice, representing a
‘top-down’ approach to consolidation.
The article now turns to consider each of these two strands of inquiry
individually, first examining the degree of political commitment in each
country.
Political Commitment
In their Transitions from Authoritarian Rule, O’Donnell and Schmitter
(1986) emphasised the need for political will to instigate reform and the
importance that the military abstain from interfering. In Mexico, due to
the long-run stability and clientele system of the PRI party, the army has
largely kept out of civilian affairs (Camp 2004: 367). It was the PRI that
initiated political change and democratic transformation at the beginning
of the 1990s, after being in power since 1929. Yet it did so only reluctantly and in response to growing pressure from both local parties and
international partners (Oelsner & Bain 2009: 293).
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