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traditional organic and agro-ecological methods, proved to be resilient.
The state responded by breaking up the large industrial farms into smaller worker cooperatives, and promoting widespread adoption of organic
and agro-ecological approaches (Alvarez and Messina 1996; Enriquez
2000; Rosset 2000; Rosset et al 2011; Sinclair and Thompson 2001;
Warwick1999; Wright 2009). Energy and fuel shortages also had incapacitating impacts on centralised government departments based in the
capital of Havana. The regime’s response was to decentralise key public
services, including education, health and support for food production.
Department of Agriculture functions that were previously separated and
centralised became integrated at regional and municipal levels (Piercy,
Granger and Goodier 2010; Wright 2009).
The commitment to social justice was maintained. The government introduced rationing, and targeted food programmes for vulnerable groups.
A national nutrition monitoring system was set up to monitor health impacts, and has become an international model of best practice (Mesa-Lago 1998; Sinclair and Thompson 2001; Wright 2009). There were no
food riots in Cuba during the Special Period. Spontaneous, and largely
illegal, community initiatives led to the spread of urban agriculture. The
regime responded creatively by legalising occupations of unused land,
urban food markets, and private food businesses, and by establishing a
Department of Urban Agriculture (Gonzalez 2003; Wright 2009). The
Cuban government response to the crisis was generally pragmatic and
reactive, in a context where centralised state agencies were relatively
incapacitated. Nonetheless, these responses were informed by socialist
and humanitarian values.
Insurgent Planning and Adaptive Governance
A key lesson from the Cuban experience is that a period of crisis and adversity may present opportunities for profound change, and for assertive,
grass-roots movements to set precedents for, and effect, policy innova-