Protection of Civilians Military Reference Guide, Second Edition Second Edition | 页面 35

Protection of Civilians Military Reference Guide
to achieve its critical capability. Plans should exploit the vulnerabilities of adversaries and
negative actors while mitigating the vulnerabilities of the military force and other actors. Usually,
final success can only be achieved by focusing on a combination of vulnerable critical
requirements so that the cumulative effect ultimately produces decisive results.
M ILITARY F ORCES
a. This category of actors normally includes only those organizations that are responsive to the
same chain of command (for example, superior, subordinate, and adjacent units from the same
national military) or coalition members. Other organizations, such as civilian, police, supportive
host-state security forces, and NGOs are considered as “positive actors” and are discussed later in
this task.
b. The center of gravity for military forces and some partners could be higher level political
will, legitimacy, command and control, the coalition, or specific forces such as mobile units or air
forces.
c. For military forces, critical capabilities may include: maintaining freedom of operation;
defeating or neutralizing threats; establishing the necessary conditions for PoC by supporting
stability, governance, development, and reconciliation; maintaining the support of the population;
and integrating with host state and other partners.
d. Critical requirements for military forces may include legitimacy; unity of effort; leadership;
logistics; command and control; mobility (including aviation); and intelligence, surveillance, and
reconnaissance capability.
e. For the military force, critical vulnerabilities may include friction with partners regarding
policies or burden-sharing; mistakes and transgressions that occur (such as civilian casualties or
criminal acts including sexual exploitation and abuse); host-state resentment of foreign troops; loss
of host-state consent; fragile domestic or international support for the mission; second-and-third
order effects such as an expansion of the conflict; extended and insecure lines of communication;
remote and vulnerable small forces (such as patrols and outposts); insufficient force to provide
widespread security; and the inability to meet the expectations of other actors. Some units may be
poorly-resourced, ill-trained, undisciplined, or nonresponsive to military superiors from other
nations. National caveats on force employment could limit the potential effectiveness of the force.
These critical vulnerabilities could reduce the military’s effectiveness, jeopardize the force’s
security, or undermine host-state consent at the tactical, operational, or strategic levels.
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