Popular Culture Review Vol. 22, No. 2, Summer 2011 | Page 21

The Doubling of Death 17 character and the fake death of an actor? If Haneke could find some human willing to die on-screen, how would our experience of seeing the film be different? Phenomenologically, this is a complicated question. A real actor would die, but the character would also be dead—the same kind of dead—in either case; and assuming that the audience does not know one way or the other, the movie-going experience would remain the same. If, however, it were announced beforehand that the actor actually died while making the film, we would have a completely different experience, likely being unable to separate the death of the actor from the death of the character. Interestingly, we would be “taken out” of the experience, moving from an act of direct perception to one of imagination as well such that the imagination would require us to imagine reality. When Hamlet stabs Polonius in Act III, scene IV of Shakespeare’s Hamlet, we do not pull out a cell phone and dial 911. Such a deranged and panicked theatergoer would not be having an experience of the play, Hamlet. However, if that theatergoer does not care at all—does not feel a jump, a start, a momentary wish to do something and a lingering feeling of trepidation and doom after the stabbing—then the play has not been doing its job as art. Having the right balance of emotional investment and sense of the fictional means that we can take the action to be real, where “real” indicates something other than what could be settled by an appeal to a correspondence theory of truth. Suppose Haneke filmed and then asked us to watch a human dying. Would we find here the first doubling of death? In the story, on paper, and on-screen, that character ceases once and for all to exist, and so too, does the actor. They die together, though separately. In the case of nonhuman animals, however, it is far more complicated. The fish, the chicken, and the pig play themselves—they are both acting and not acting. They likely have no conscious, trained, or intentional role in the film and so their deaths are as characters, unintentional actors, as well as real animals simultaneously. In the context of the films themselves, all of the deaths are final, regardless of whether an actor leaves the soundstage that day intact or not. The actor’s life is not at stake except in the case of animals. Which is, perhaps, why viewers object more to the deaths of the animals. Their deaths appear to extend out from the film into real life, and for what reason? Juxtaposed with the deaths of the fictional characters with which they share the screen, how do such deaths talk to each other? What do they say to the audience? In an act of imagination, human death would be different. If we were to see, say, Juliette Binoche actually die on-screen in Cache we would no longer think, “Oh, that character is dead.” We would also think, “Oh, Juliette Binoche is dead.” This realization would take the viewer away from the movie and into the implications of the apparent real death—the death of the actress looming larger than the death of a make-believe character. But how do we consider the death of the rooster in that same movie? Do we mourn at all, and if we do, what are we mourning? How far from the film this animal death takes us is typically a