Popular Culture Review Vol. 19, No. 1, Winter 2008 | Page 10

6 Popular Culture Review President Reagan exploited these insecurities and provided a sense of purpose for Americans on the international stage by rekindling Cold War fears of a monolithic communist movement centered in Moscow. Describing the Soviet Union as the ‘"evil empire” responsible for threats to American interests and democracy in Western Europe, Angola, Ethiopia, Afghanistan, and Central America, the Reagan administration won Congressional approval for a SI.2 trillion increase in defense spending. Thus, Reagan successfully exploited simplistic Hollywood conceptions of the good-guy white hats opposed to the evil figures in black hats and outfits. Indeed, historians have noted the extent to which the public policies of the Reagan White House were shaped by the former actor’s Hollywood experiences both on and off the screen. In Ronald Reagan’s Hollywood, Stephen Vaughn argues that during the 1940s and 1950s, the nation’s film capital was divided over many of the same issues which dominated American political debate in the 1980s: matters involving communism, liberalism, welfare, the revival of patriotism, national defense, the role of Judeo-Christianity in entertainment and politics, women and the family, sexual behavior, anti-Semitism and ethnicity, racism and civil rights, the use of history, and freedom of expression to name a few.3 While his film past certainly exerted considerable influence, the President also employed contemporary Hollywood symbols from the popular Star Wars series to denigrate the Soviet Union and celebrate his Strategic Defense Initiative. The role played by popular culture, notwithstanding, scholarly interpretations vary regarding the impact of Reagan’s defense build-up and targeting of the Soviet Union. Reagan partisans credited the President with ending the Cold War and ushering in the collapse of Soviet totalitarianism. Critics of the Reagan administration, on the other hand, found the military spending and bellicose rhetoric dangerous, crediting the avoidance of a wider conflict to Reagan’s luck and policies of his Soviet counterpart, Mikhail Gorbachev. In The Unfinished Journey, William Chafe asserts that the spirit of negotiation and compromise which marked the final years of the Reagan was “above all a gift of Gorbachev, who for his reasons had entered into the world stage with a commitment to radical change.”4 The pivotal nuclear discourse of the 1980s was hardly limited to traditional venues of political debate as the popular culture art medium of the feature motion picture sought to both influence and reflect the national conversation. In The Films o f the Eighties, William J. Palmer maintains that popular film, placed within historical and cultural context, comprises insightful social history texts. Palmer writes, “The importance of film history lies not in the images or themes of individual films but in the emplotted metaphors and motifs shared by groups of films that together portray, approach, and even comment upon a specific historical event or sociohistorical trend.” In a similar vein, Robert Burgoyne