Popular Culture Review Vol. 16, No. 1, Spring 2005 | Page 39

Spectres of Fear 35
nullifying others when unaware . Bin Laden ’ s alleged assassination of his long time friend and mentor , Abdullah Azzam , falls into this Machiavellian ideal . 3
Rapoport claims that Nizari victims were usually prominent figures who had deviated from “ true Islam ,” and who had “ ignored warnings to change their behaviour ” ( 1990 , 121 ). Nizari assailants referred to themselves as fidayeen ( consecrated or dedicated ones )— indicative of the way they saw their actions as a religious duty ( 122 ). Young boys were often chosen to become fidayeen . According to Rapoport , the Nizari would sometimes place a neophyte fidayeen in “ the service of a high official ” ( 121 ). After several years of faithful duty , the fidayeen would be ordered to murder his master with a knife , the Nizari ’ s favourite weapon . For ordinary Muslims a fidayeen ’ s apparent “ immunity for personal or ordinary feelings ” led to the widespread belief that Nizari were “ hashish eaters ” ( hashashin ), “ the source of the word assassin ” ( 121 ).
Muslim awe of the Nizari has resurfaced in the form of global terrorists , skilful in different types of invisibility : adept in camouflage , remaining undetected , smuggling , dispersing , and incubating terrorist cells . Al- Qaeda ’ s knack for remaining elusive has increased after military operations in Afghanistan in 2002 . While a large part of Al-Qaeda ’ s infrastructure and leadership were nullified , this has prompted Al-Qaeda to diversify , making it “ more difficult to detect and eliminate ” ( McCullough , Keats , and Burgess 2002 , 3 ). For example , the group has exchanged currency for gold and diamonds , which are easier to smuggle across borders , and increased its reliance on informal money transfers , known as haw alas , that are virtually untraceable .
Attacks by Al-Qaeda in Saudi Arabia and Morroco in May 2003 confirm Jihadists ’ talent for monstrous deception . Moreover , the media lexicon for describing Al-Qaeda gives rise to an imagery which is found in the insect world . For instance , an analysis of the Al-Qaeda cell reveals the insect principle of “ mimicry as self protection ” ( Warner 1998 , 176 ): a self-sufficient unit which is both separate from , yet linked to , a loosely affiliated global network of terror cells , able to segment and disperse when under attack and to disappear either underground or into enemy territory , until called again for action ( Carrol 2002 , 94 ). The insect principle of segmentation was revealed by the newly appointed Al-Qaeda spokesman , Thabet ibn Qais who recently claimed that a new Al- Qaeda leadership had been created which is shielded from U . S . intelligence agencies and whose names are unknown to the old Al-Qaeda leadership
( Shahzad 2003 , 1 ).
This is the inexorable dilemma of the West . The West ’ s prodigious technology and empiric power cannot control the Chimera ’ s wrath . Having learnt much of their deadly art from western agencies , modem Jihadists have constructed their own blueprint for Armageddon . Keith Hart is more blatant : “ So now we have an unlimited war on terrorism , waged against the same Islamic fundamentalism that the CIA once encouraged in the Mujaheddin ” ( Hart 2002 , 5 ). To borrow a Hobbesian phrase of governance , Jihadism ’ s power has been its