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Popular Culture Review
contending that its viewers quickly forgot the brief stories in a fast newsreel. In
stead, Carter expressed support for the use of documentaries as a propagandist^
tool that will “implant ... lasting impressions” (USIA, 1966a, 7-8). While Mark
B. Lewis objected to Kingfish’s lack of items addressing African interests, USIA
colleague Daniel P. Oleksin remained hopeful that the Associated Newsreel would
provide dividends in the Far East. In fact, Lewis’ main complaint was that the
USIA was being too cautious about “overburdening” the newsreel with policy con
tent concerning the Far East and other strategic areas (7-8).
In 1965, the USIA debate was particularly evident when the Agency polled
fifteen country public affairs officers (PAOs) concerning the effects of an increase
in policy-oriented content. The polling results opposed a sharp increase in policyrelated stories, with some of these officers indicating the content could be made
more useful to country programs in a subtle way. Five PAOs argued that there
would be “great risk” of censorship or compromise of the “commercial cover” if a
harder policy line were followed. They cited as an example a story about the U.S.
“White Paper” on Vietnam that was censored out of a newsreel in India, Lebanon,
Nepal, and the United Arab Republic. Meanwhile, four PAOs anticipated some
risks, but four others thought the risk would be inconsequential or nonexistent
(USIA, 1966a, 10-11).
A major change in Kingfish format occurred in January 1966, after a twentyweek audit showed that of 105 stories carried separately in the regional editions,
only 39 were used exclusively in a single area. Sixty-six of the other “regional”
stories appeared in more than one regional edition, at the same time or in later
editions. Despite the small percentage of stories appearing in only one edition, the
USIA understood that the regional editions still provided greater targeting possi
bilities for area-related stories than a subsequent world edition (USIA, 1966a, 11).
As Project Kingfish progressed, some USIA officials decried the deteriorat
ing quality of the propaganda newsreels. An undated memo from A. Guarco to
Maurice Silverstein, president of Associated Newsreels, warned that the “steadily
dwindling supply and variety of stories available” were lowering quality in both
the news and cinematographic items finally used. Eric T. Clarke, USIA officer in
charge of Kingfish from 1956-1966, agreed with this assessment, noting that the
newsreels show “the effects of stringency—fewer news coverage, greater reliance
upon handouts and items obtained by exchange” (USIA, 1966a, 16). This position
was buttressed by a USIA report indicating that while the length of each newsreel
had remained at ten minutes since 1953, the number of stories used had steadily
declined because of “a lack of newsworthy items.” It recommended “fewer brief
shots of American dignitaries on vague missions,” adding that more detailed ex
planations of the purpose of such trips were essential to the success of Project
Kingfish (USIA, 1966a, 18).